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REMEDIAL CONSILIENCE
Marco Jimenez*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides a new way of organizing and thinking about one of
the most important, useful, and ubiquitous—yet misunderstood, neglected, and
underdeveloped—areas in all of law: remedies. Even though remedial issues
are present in every case, too little theoretical attention has been paid to them,
leaving a wide array of remedial doctrines—from injunctions to declaratory
decrees, punitive damages to contempt, and unjust enrichment to specific
performance—in search of a unifying theory.
This Article offers such a theory. Specifically, it argues that the broad
array of seemingly distinctive remedies, operating over diverse subject matter
areas, can be organized and justified by way of four distinct but related
remedial principles: the principles of restoration, retribution, coercion, and
protection. Each principle focuses on either the victim or the wrongdoer, and
does so from either an ex ante or ex post perspective. These principles, in turn,
allow one to organize and unify a large swath of seemingly unique and
unrelated remedies under a broad conceptual umbrella.
More importantly, however, by showing that seemingly idiosyncratic
remedies reflect larger remedial principles, it is my hope that this Article—by
identifying and exploring the relationship between and among these
principles—can help judges, practitioners, and policy makers think more
clearly about what they are doing, as a descriptive matter, and ought to be
doing, as a normative matter, when awarding and justifying any particular
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remedy—a matter they must consider no less frequently than in every single
case.
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I. REMEDIAL DISUNITY: IDENTIFYING THE FOUR REMEDIAL INTERESTS
Though Solomon himself were to lay down the substantive law,
though it were to satisfy every just demand of natural right and social
policy, the law would be an imperfect instrument unless and until the
1
remedies applicable were formulated with equal care.

– Charles Alan Wright
In a seminal article written over half a century ago, Professor Charles Alan
Wright lamented that although “[e]very litigated case, without exception,
necessarily includes a question of remedy,” there was still—as recently as
1955—“no law of remedies.”2 The scholar, judge, or practitioner interested in
obtaining a bird’s-eye view of the field could find no single source where “the
whole subject [was] put in perspective,” but was left to comb through separate
treatises on “Damages, Equity, Specific Performance, Injunction, QuasiContracts, Rescission, Declaratory Judgments, Restitution, and perhaps
others”3 to gather shards from a broken field she would have to reconstruct for
1

Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. L.J. 376, 377 (1955).
Id. at 376; see also id. at 377 (“Civil actions are not brought to vindicate nice theories as to negligence
or nuisance or consideration. They are brought because a person who has been injured, or is afraid he may be,
wishes to prevent the injury or be redressed for it.”).
3 Id. at 376. There was, in short, “no place where [one could] find the whole subject put in perspective.”
Id. Even today, students are confounded by the sheer number of remedies available for seemingly identical
wrongs and are taught to think about (or memorize!) remedies in terms of a hodgepodge of rules regarding
2
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herself. Even today, far too many lawyers and judges think about remedies as
appendages to substantive fields, and talk in specific terms about “contract
remedies,” “tort remedies,” or “remedies for unjust enrichment,” rather than
more generally about the underlying remedial principles holding these
seemingly disparate fields together. Fortunately, since the time of Professor
Wright, many remedies scholars have begun to organize remedies along the
lines of general remedial principles (e.g., “compensation,” “restitution,” or
“punishment”),4 but even here, too little attention has been paid to the
relationship that exists between and among these remedial principles;
relationships that, if discovered, would help unify the field of remedies by
highlighting the shared characteristics underlying all remedies in every
substantive field.
This Article attempts to fill this gap by making sense of the deep structure
of remedies. Specifically, this Article develops a framework that identifies and
unites these seemingly diverse remedial principles into a unified whole, and
offers a new way to think about (and justify) what judges do (and ought to do)
when awarding remedies. My claim is this: the ostensibly distinct remedies
legal versus equitable remedies, contract versus tort damages, specific performance versus replevin, cost of
completion versus diminution in value damages, expectation versus reliance damages, compensatory damages
versus restitutionary versus punitive damages, injunctive versus declaratory relief, and they struggle to fit in
other concepts such as contempt, nominal damages, accounting for profits, constructive trusts, equitable liens,
subrogation, etc. The list of terms one is confronted with when endeavoring to understand the “subject” of
remedies goes on and on.
4 For example, several modern remedies casebooks have revealed these connections to the student by
organizing the material along functional lines. For instance, in his leading casebook, Professor Laycock not
only discusses broad remedies categories that apply across many substantive fields (i.e., compensatory
remedies, preventive remedies, restitutionary remedies, punitive remedies, and ancillary remedies), but also
goes one step further and helpfully discusses two overarching theories, corrective justice and law and
economics, which run throughout the law of remedies and have been offered by others as being capable of
helping these broad general principles hang together in a coherent fashion. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN
AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xxix, xxx, 3, 15–19 (3d ed. 2002) (“[T]he book reflects my
belief that a course in remedies should not be a series of appendices to the substantive curriculum. It contains
no chapters on remedies for particular wrongs or particular kinds of injury. Such chapters are important, but
their place is in the substantive courses to which they pertain. This book attempts to explore general principles
about the law of remedies that cut across substantive fields and that will be useful to a student or lawyer
encountering a remedies problem in any substantive context.”); see also DAVID I. LEVINE ET AL., REMEDIES:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, at vii (4th ed. 2006) (“The traditional organization of a remedies book subordinates the
remedy to the substantive law, classifying the material in whole or in part by cause of action: remedies for
damage to chattel, remedies for damage to land, remedies for breach of contract, etc. We believe that there is
more to be learned by adopting a transsubstantive approach to remedies. By organizing the material around the
remedy, and not the substantive law, our materials allow the professor and the student to explore the concerns
that are common to remedial issues in whatever substantive context they arise.”).
For a wonderful discussion of how remedies came to be thought of as its own field of law, see Douglas
Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161 (2008).
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(e.g., expectation damages, injunctions, restitution, contempt, punitive
damages) that reign over the vast terrain of seemingly unrelated substantive
fields (e.g., torts, contracts, unjust enrichment, property, constitutional law)
mostly fall into one (or more) broad remedial categories, which are themselves
related, and serve to protect one (or more) discrete and well-defined “remedial
interest(s).” Each remedial interest, in turn, focuses on either the victim
(usually the plaintiff) or the wrongdoer (usually the defendant) from one of
two temporal perspectives: an ex ante perspective, which focuses on remedies
issued prior to the commission of a wrongful act (a preventive injunction, for
example, would fall into this category), or an ex post perspective, which
focuses on remedies issued after a wrongful act has been committed (an award
of money damages, for example, would fall into this category).
The remedial taxonomy developed above can be usefully mapped onto the
following remedial matrix, to which I will refer throughout this Article.
FIGURE 1: THE REMEDIAL MATRIX
Temporal Element
Ex Ante
Ex Post
Victim

IV

I

Wrongdoer

III

II

Personal
Element

In quadrant I resides the “restorative interest,” where the principle of
restoration is paramount. Here, the law of remedies tends to be approached
from an ex post, victim-oriented perspective and is concerned with making the
plaintiff whole by restoring the victim of a wrongful harm to the position he or
she occupied prior to the harm. The most common restorative remedy is an
award of money damages (e.g., expectation damages),5 but in-kind relief, such
as requiring a defendant to specifically perform a contract or to return stolen

5

LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 4.
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goods (e.g., through the writ of replevin), would fall under this category as
well.6
In quadrant II resides the “retributive interest,” which views remedies from
an ex post, wrongdoer-oriented perspective and tends to reflect society’s desire
to punish wrongdoers (usually in accordance to the severity of their wrong) for
the harms they have inflicted. Punitive damages is probably the most obvious
example of a remedy falling into quadrant II, although, as this Article will
argue in a future section,7 any remedy that forces a defendant to unwillingly
transfer to another something to which he or she asserts a recognizable
property interest could constitute retributive punishment. Thus, for instance,
the body of law governing unjust enrichment, which attempts to take from the
defendant the very thing (or its value) he or she has taken from the plaintiff
would largely fall into quadrant II.
In quadrant III resides the “coercive interest.” This remedial interest takes
an ex ante, wrongdoer-oriented approach to remedies and reflects society’s
interest in ensuring that potential future wrongdoers are both deterred (i.e.,
negative coercion) from committing socially inefficient acts and incentivized
(i.e., positive coercion) to commit socially productive acts. Insofar as punitive
damages are designed to deter future wrongdoers rather than punish a
particular wrongdoer, they provide a good example of negative coercion. An
example of positive coercion would be, for instance, a court’s sanction of
coercive civil contempt to compel a party to comply with a court order.
Finally, in quadrant IV resides the “protective interest,” which seems to be
the least appreciated and developed of the four remedial interests, though
arguably the most important, for reasons that will be discussed later in this
Article.8 This interest approaches remedies from an ex ante, victim-centered
perspective and reflects society’s desire to protect potential victims from
threatened transgressions before any harm occurs. Although negative
injunctions (i.e., injunctions requiring an adjudicated wrongdoer to refrain
from engaging in a prohibited activity) provide the quintessential example of a
remedy falling within this category, I hope to show by the end of this Article
that many (if not most) remedies already serve, to a greater or lesser extent,

6
7
8

Id.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.D.
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this basic remedial interest and should therefore be crafted with this most
fundamental remedial interest in mind.9
Given the discussion above, we can now update the previous remedial
matrix as follows:
FIGURE 2: THE FOUR REMEDIAL INTERESTS
Temporal Element
Ex Ante
Ex Post
Victim

Protection (IV)

Restoration (I)

Wrongdoer

Coercion (III)

Retribution (II)

Personal
Element

With this chart before us, my thesis can now be set forth in two parts. First,
this Article argues that all of the remedies with which we are familiar (e.g.,
expectation damages, specific performance, punitive damages, injunctions,
contempt, and restitution), in addition to the vast array of remedies at a judge’s
disposal, can generally be understood as advancing one (or more) of these
remedial interests. This is the focus of Part II of this Article where each
remedial interest is explored in some depth.
Second, Part III of this Article argues that this organization reveals the
following important and previously unappreciated relationship between and
among these remedial interests: that in a bipolar litigation model, in which the
victim is made whole by the wrongdoer,10 a remedy located within any given
quadrant will not only accomplish the goals unique to the quadrant within
which it is located, but will also have predictable effects on the subsequent
quadrant as well. Thus, for instance, a remedy designed to advance quadrant
I’s restoration interest (e.g., paying to the victim a sum of money as
compensatory damages) will also advance quadrant II’s retributive interest,
because retributive justice will require that the sum paid to the victim be taken
9

See infra Part III.A.
As opposed, for example, to a victim being made whole by a special master administering a victim
compensation fund.
10
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from the adjudicated wrongdoer’s pocket to make the victim whole. This
quadrant II payment, in turn, will provide some measure of deterrence against
other potential wrongdoers who are thinking about engaging in such costly
behavior, thereby advancing the interests located in quadrant III (i.e., negative
coercion). And this deterrence, in turn, will afford a certain measure of
protection to similarly situated potential victims, thereby paying homage to the
values located within quadrant IV’s protective interest. By this account then,
every remedy will tend, to a greater or lesser extent, toward the protection
interest located within quadrant IV, if only indirectly. This relationship is
illustrated in Figure 3 below.
FIGURE 3: THE REMEDIAL PATHWAY
Temporal Element
Ex Ante
Ex Post
Victim

Protection (IV)

Restoration (I)

Wrongdoer

Coercion (III)

Retribution (II)

Personal
Element

Before proceeding further, it is worth pausing to make a few observations.
First, it is useful to note that the remedial interests reflected in quadrant I (the
restorative interest) and quadrant III (the coercive interest) are at the forefront
of the well-known debate in the private law between corrective justice
scholars,11 on the one hand, who emphasize that remedies ought to provide just
compensation to the victims of wrongful conduct,12 and law and economics
scholars,13 on the other hand, who emphasize that remedies ought to be chosen
to efficiently deter potential future wrongdoers.14 The taxonomy also helps us
readily identify a similar tension that pervades the criminal law, where heated
11 See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5 (1995); Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and
the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 357 (1992).
12 LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 16.
13 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1–4 (1987); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981); Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
14 LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 17.
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debate has raged for centuries between those who have argued that punishment
can only be justified on retributive grounds15 (quadrant II) and those who have
argued that punishment, as an evil to be avoided where possible,16 can only be
justified when it has the salutary effect of deterring future crimes17 (quadrant
III). In both of these instances, the taxonomy presented above reveals that
scholars and judges holding fast to their understanding of an issue have little
chance of coming to an agreement with members of an opposing camp about
the resolution of difficult remedial problems (hence, the centuries-long debates
in these areas) not because one side is “wrong,” or unreasonable, or unwilling
to come to terms with its ideological adversary, but because each side is
focusing on different personal and temporal aspects of the remedial problems
before them! Stated differently, each side is arguing, in effect, about different
pieces of the same remedial puzzle, and too little emphasis is paid to the shared
remedial purpose that is (indirectly), and ought to be (directly), the focus of
most of these remedies: protecting potential victims!

15 See, e.g., GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶ 100 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1952) (1821) (“[P]unishment is regarded as containing the criminal’s right and hence by being
punished he is honoured as a rational being. He does not receive this due of honour unless the concept and
measure of his punishment are derived from his own act. Still less does he receive it if he is treated either as a
harmful animal who has to be made harmless, or with a view to deterring and reforming him.”); IMMANUEL
KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie trans., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1887) (“Juridical
Punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another Good either with regard to the
Criminal himself or to Civil Society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it
is inflicted has committed a Crime. . . . The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who creeps
through the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the
Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of it . . . .”); Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179,
181–82 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (“We are justified in punishing because and only because offenders
deserve it. Moral culpability (‘desert’) is in such a view both a sufficient as well as a necessary condition of
liability to punitive sanctions.” (footnote omitted)).
16 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 158 (J.H.
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1789) (“[A]ll punishment in itself is evil.”); see also
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 223 (A.R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651) (“A Punishment, is
an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same
Authority to be a Transgression of the Law . . . .”).
17 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) (“The great end of punishment is not the expiation or
atonement of the offence committed, but the prevention of future offences of the same kind.”); BENTHAM,
supra note 16, at 165 (noting punishment should be administered “to prevent, in as far as it is possible, and
worth while, all sorts of offences whatsoever”); WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 383–85 (West & Richardson, 8th American ed. 1815) (“The proper end of human punishment is,
not the satisfaction of justice, but the prevention of crimes.”); EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF
LEGAL PUNISHMENT 29 (1966) (“[T]raditional utilitarians hold that punishment can be justified only by
reference to prevention of crime.”).
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This Article proceeds by laying bare each piece of the remedial puzzle by
examining each remedial interest in some detail. In the course of doing so, this
Article attempts to show the manner in which these remedial interests are
related to one another, and explores the consequences of this relationship for
the law of remedies. Finally, this Article offers some concluding thoughts not
only on the protective interest, but also on the law of remedies as a whole.
II. REMEDIAL PLURALISM: EXPLORING THE FOUR REMEDIAL INTERESTS
A. The Restorative Interest
In seeking to identify a principle or set of principles by which the law of
remedies might be organized, perhaps no notion comes more readily to mind
than that of “mak[ing] the victim whole.”18 Since the dawn of time—or at least
since unregulated blood feuds were replaced by organized systems of
“composition” and money damages19—it has been a truism of private law
adjudication that a party legally wronged by another shall have a right of
redress against the wrongdoing party.20 The right of redress for a harm that has
already occurred, of course, is necessarily a backward-looking remedy that
focuses on the victim’s interest in restoration (quadrant I). Such relief may, in
turn, take one of two forms: substitutionary (i.e., where some replacement,
usually money damages, is given as a substitute for the thing lost) and in-kind
relief (i.e., where the exact thing that was taken from the victim is given back
to him or her).
Compensatory damages is the most common form of substitutionary
restoration awarded by judges, and is probably the most common of all private
law remedies.21 In its most basic form, this “basic principle underlying
common law remedies [states that remedies] shall afford only compensation
for the injury suffered.”22 The amount of compensation, however, is not merely
a matter of discretion to be decided upon by a judge or jury; the remedy
18 Indeed, this notion stretches back all the way to the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1750 B.C.) and has been
with us since. See, e.g., Stephen Schafer, Victim Compensation and Responsibility, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 55, 55
(1970).
19 See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutilation
of Bodies, or Setting of Prices?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41, 82–83 (1995); see also S. B. CHRIMES, ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 64–65 (3d ed. 1965).
20 See LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 1.
21 See, e.g., Schafer, supra note 18, at 56–57, 63.
22 See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 63 (1930) (“[T]he basic principle underlying common
law remedies [is] that they shall afford only compensation for the injury suffered . . . .”).
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should, so far as possible, restore the injured party to his or her rightful
position.23
The benefit of such a principle is twofold. First, in an ideal world with a
well-functioning market, an award of compensatory damages will, in many
cases, allow a party who has been deprived of some right (e.g., the victim’s car
has been stolen) to purchase an exact equivalent in the open market (e.g., a
new car),24 which, after compensation, would make it “as though” the victim
were never injured.25 This is so because the award of money damages should
make the victim indifferent between the preservation of the right, on the one
hand, or its deprivation plus a compensatory sum, on the other.26
Second, this principle allows us to make sense of a broad range of
seemingly distinct remedies: Whether we are speaking generally about
damages across a broad range of substantive fields (e.g., contracts and torts),27
or specifically about particular damages awarded within a given substantive
field (e.g., expectation, reliance, and restitution damages in contracts; pain and
suffering damages in torts; and restitution and disgorgement damages in unjust
enrichment), by couching these seemingly distinct remedies in terms of more
general principles, one can go a long way not only toward uniting this
otherwise chaotic array of individual remedies, but can also provide each
remedy with a degree of theoretical coherence and legitimacy that can help
solve similar remedial problems.

23 United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958) (“The fundamental principle of damages
is to restore the injured party, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it not been for
the wrong of the other party.”).
24 See LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 22 (“In functioning markets, giving plaintiffs the value of what they
lost implements the rightful position by enabling plaintiffs to replace the thing they lost. Plaintiffs may choose
to spend the money some other way, but so long as the choice is theirs, there is no reason to doubt that they
have been made whole.”).
25 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 491 (5th ed. 2008). A perfectly
restorative substitutionary remedy would make the victim indifferent between the preservation of the right at
issue, on the one hand, and the deprivation of the right at issue plus a specific compensatory sum, on the other.
26 See, e.g., id. (“Perfect compensation is a sum of money that leaves the victim indifferent between the
injury with compensation or no injury.”). Of course, there are some injuries for which money damages will
always be inadequate, ranging from wrongful death, at one end of the spectrum, to the loss of goods to which
the owner attaches some unique, idiosyncratic value (e.g., a family heirloom), at the other end. For these types
of injuries, the court employs the irreparable injury rule to protect the injured party with a property rule
whenever possible. See LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 380–81.
27 See, e.g., Chronister Oil Co. v. Unocal Refining & Mktg., 34 F.3d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The point
of an award of damages, whether it is for a breach of contract or for a tort, is, so far as possible, to put the
victim where he would have been had the breach or tort not taken place.”).
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Indeed, the claim that one of the main purposes of remedies is to
compensate victims for the harms they have suffered may seem too banal to
merit discussion. It is. But I am not concerned with a general failure among
judges, commentators, or litigants to underemphasize the importance of
compensatory remedies. Rather, it is the opposite problem with which I am
concerned: the importance of compensatory remedies is much too frequently
overemphasized by commentators and judges alike,28 much to the detriment of
other important remedial goals.
Overemphasizing compensatory remedies is problematic for several
reasons. First, it may cause us to overlook the fact that remedies can and
should serve other principles beyond merely providing “compensation for the
injury suffered.”29 In fact, these other principles are at least as important and,
in some cases, more important than a principle that seemingly focuses
exclusively on compensatory damages would seem to indicate.30 Too narrow a
focus on compensatory damages, therefore, may cause one to misunderstand
the nature of many remedies.
The second problem is, as suggested in the beginning of this section, that
compensatory damages are not even the be-all, end-all restorative remedy and
should (at the very least) be thought of alongside other in-kind restorative
remedies that, contrary to popular perception,31 are both more basic—and more
commonly preferred by judges, commentators, and litigants themselves—than
the traditional emphasis on compensatory damages would indicate.32
28 See, e.g., O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to keep a
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing
else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable
to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference.”).
29 Cf. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 63 (1930) (“[T]he basic principle underlying common law
remedies [is] that they shall afford only compensation for the injury suffered . . . .”).
30 These principles will be taken up infra in Part II.B–D.
31 See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap
Press 1963) (1881) (“It is true that in some instances equity does what is called compelling specific
performance. But . . . . [t]his remedy is an exceptional one. The only universal consequence of a legally
binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to
pass.”).
32 See id.; DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 385 (4th ed.
2010) (“Plaintiff’s right to the property through replevin casts doubt on claims that Anglo-American law
reflects a preference for substitutionary relief over specific relief . . . .”); id. at 391 (arguing that the irreparable
injury rule is dead, in that “whenever the choice of remedy matters to [the] plaintiff, the rule is satisfied”); see
also USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems Grp., Inc., 796 A.2d 7, 14–15 (Del. Super. Ct.) (“[F]or the remedy
at law to prevail, the remedy at law must be: available as a matter of right; full, fair and complete; and as
practical and efficient to the ends of justice as the equitable remedy. This is a very practical standard which
favors equity in cases where the Plaintiff for good reason seeks relief other than money damage.” (citations
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It is often the case, for example, that although a plaintiff seeks to be
restored to his or her rightful position, substitutionary restorative remedies
(i.e., compensatory damages) simply will not do, perhaps because the
substitutionary remedy is itself inadequate,33 perhaps because a court has
decided that even where money damages are adequate, a right-holder ought to
be entitled to something more fundamental than a mere award of compensatory
damages,34 or perhaps because, quite simply, the plaintiff desires specific
relief35 and the court can find no reason why it ought to be denied.36 Where
one or more of these factors are present, a party will often request that he or
she be restored in-kind to his or her rightful position and a court will frequently
oblige.37
In any event, even where substitutionary restorative remedies (e.g.,
compensatory damages) are combined with in-kind restorative remedies (e.g.,
omitted)), aff’d, 781 A.2d 696 (Del. 2001) (mem.); Van Wagner Adver. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d
756, 759 n.2 (N.Y. 1986) (“While the usual remedy in Anglo-American law has been damages, rather than
compensation ‘in kind,’ the current trend among commentators appears to favor the remedy of specific
performance, but the view is not unanimous.” (citations omitted)). The court in USH Ventures went on to note
that remedies are merely “choices to solve problems,” and called for the abolition of the “hierarchy between
law and equity.” Id. at 15.
33 See, e.g., Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Intra Brokers, Inc., 24 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[F]or
equitable relief to be appropriate, there must generally be no adequate legal remedy.”).
34 See, e.g., Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co., 73 S.E. 82, 84 (W. Va. 1911) (noting that, although the
irreparable injury rule may “permit[] a mere trespasser to utterly destroy the forest of his neighbor, provided he
is solvent and able to respond in damages to the extent of the value thereof,” such a rule is contrary to the
“general principles of English and American jurisprudence,” which “guarantee to the owner of property the
right, not only to possession thereof and dominion over it, but also its immunity from injury”).
35 See, e.g., Brook v. James A. Cullimore & Co., 436 P.2d 32, 35 (Okla. 1967) (allowing recovery of
personal property under the legal remedy of replevin, without regard to whether the irreparable injury rule is
satisfied, although the defendant offered to pay fair market value of the goods withheld). Replevin is now a
generally available remedy for contracts for the sale of goods. See U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (2011) (allowing specific
performance not only where “the goods are unique,” but also “in other proper circumstances”); id. § 2-716(3)
(specifically mentioning replevin).
36 See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82–83 (3d Cir. 1948) (paying homage to the
traditional rule that “[a] party may have specific performance of a contract for the sale of chattels if the legal
remedy is inadequate,” but noting that there is “no reason why a court should be reluctant to grant specific
relief when it can be given without supervision of the court or other time-consuming processes against one
who has deliberately broken his agreement,” and denying specific performance on other grounds).
37 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744, 746 (1974) (“[T]he scope of the [injunctive] remedy
is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. . . . [T]he remedy is necessarily designed,
as all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied
in the absence of such conduct.”); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY
RULE 23 (1991) (“Courts do not deny specific relief merely because they judge the legal remedy adequate. The
irreparable injury rule almost never bars specific relief, because substitutionary remedies are almost never
adequate. At the stage of permanent relief, any litigant with a plausible need for specific relief can satisfy the
irreparable injury rule.”).
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injunctions for specific performance of a contract), these forms of judicial
relief collectively still only make up a portion of the remedies awarded by
courts and therefore do little to explain the numerous other remedies that
courts frequently award. Restorative remedies, in short, are necessary but not
sufficient to account for the numerous individual remedies awarded more
broadly within the “law” of remedies.
What may be said of these other nonrestorative remedies? Are they merely
aberrations to more fundamental restorative remedies, relegated to a
miscellaneous remedial category called “other things courts do when
restoration is not an option”? Or, do these nonrestorative remedies speak to
something more fundamental?
To answer this, we must turn our attention to the other remedial interests,
not only as methods of categorizing the various remedies, but also as a means
of exploring the relationship between and among the various remedial
interests. If we are to be satisfied with the four remedial interests as a way of
not only categorizing but also justifying the various remedies courts award, we
will have to do much better than merely point out that certain remedies tend to
fall into certain remedial categories.
B. The Retributive Interest
Punishment is punishment, only where it is deserved. We pay the
penalty, because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if
punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever than because it
is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an
38
abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be.

– F.H. Bradley
Juxtaposed to the substantive goal of restoration—which takes a backwardlooking, victim-centered approach to remedies and attempts to restore the
victim to his or her rightful position—another principle by which the law of
remedies might be organized is the principle of retribution, which would take a
backward-looking, wrongdoer-centered approach and focus not on what
should be given to the victim by way of restoration, but on what should be
taken from the wrongdoer by way of retributive punishment.

38

F.H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 26–27 (2d ed. 1927).
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Admittedly, it may seem strange to talk about retribution as a principle by
which the law of remedies might be organized. As J. D. Mabbott once
observed, retributivism seems to be “the only moral theory except perhaps
psychological hedonism which has been definitely destroyed by criticism,”39
and I suspect that many of us, when we think about retribution, instinctively
conjure up an age in which uncivilized man, unable to control his bloodlust,40
acted upon some vaguely articulated visceral need to mete out revenge41
against those who had wronged him.42 Additionally, even assuming that
retribution could be dressed up and made to look more respectable in polite
company, the entire idea seems to lend itself to criminal law, rather than civil
law, where it is frequently juxtaposed with another ubiquitous principle we
shall soon be discussing—coercion.43 The mere thought of retribution as an
organizing principle in private law, therefore, not only grates against the ears
of many civil law scholars, but also seems to cut against the innumerable
instances in which judges have gone out of their way to categorically reaffirm
the shibboleth of restoration while denying the normative and descriptive
significance of retribution.44

39 J. D. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152, 152 (1939). Over the past seventy years, however, this
atavism of moral philosophy has made a bit of a comeback in no small part due to Mabbott’s article, but
mostly in the public law realm. See, e.g., D J Galligan, The Return to Retribution in Penal Theory, in CRIME,
PROOF AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR RUPERT CROSS 144, 144 (1981). Retributivism is still
largely ignored in the realm of private law remedies, a defect I hope this Article will help remedy.
40 See HOLMES, supra note 31, at 40 (“It certainly may be argued, with some force, that it has never
ceased to be one object of punishment to satisfy the desire for vengeance.”).
41 See, e.g., id. at 45 (describing retribution as “vengeance in disguise”); KARL A. MENNINGER, THE
HUMAN MIND 448 (3d ed. 1947) (“The reasons usually given to justify punishment do not explain why it
exists. They serve only to conceal the truth, that the scheme of punishment is a barbarous system of revenge,
by which society tries to ‘get even’ with the criminal.”); PINCOFFS, supra note 17, at 45 (“To give as one’s
reason for inflicting pain or deprivation on a man that he has done a certain thing is an all too familiar way of
talking. This is the language of revenge.”). But see IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 214 (Louis Infield
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1981) (1930) (drawing a distinction between retributive punishment and revenge,
insisting that the former requires a principle of equality between the crime and the punishment, whereas the
latter is marked by an “insist[ence] on one’s right beyond what is necessary for its defence,” making such
punishment “revengeful”).
42 See, e.g., PINCOFFS, supra note 17, at 1 (“Legal punishment is viewed by some of the most sensitive
and well-educated people of our time as a survival of barbarism, bereft of rational foundation, supported only
by inertia and the wish to have vengeance on criminals.”).
43 See infra Part II.C.
44 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 127–28 (7th ed. 2007). Standard economic
analysis suggests that the goal of contract remedies is “compensation and not compulsion.” See, e.g., E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.3, at 737 (4th ed. 2004). Because of this, promisors who breach for financial
reasons “should not be dealt with harshly,” concepts like punitive damages have no place in contract law
because they will “encourage performance when breach would be socially more desirable,” and “‘[w]illful’
breaches should not be distinguished from other breaches.” Id.
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Yet, as this Article argues below, the notion of retribution nevertheless
does play a significant role across a wide range of private and public law
remedies, and the failure to recognize this concept renders incomprehensible a
large swath of remedies issued daily by courts around the country. To be clear,
my claim here is not that courts exercise (or even possess) unbridled discretion
to vindictively punish parties to their gavel’s content. They do not. What I do
mean to suggest, however, is that courts frequently exercise their discretion to
implement a very circumscribed and principled type of punishment—
retributive punishment—on a much more regular basis than is commonly
acknowledged. Therefore, before proceeding further, I want to pause and
briefly sketch out precisely what I mean when I use the term retribution or
retributive punishment throughout the remainder of this article.
Although retribution is a particularly slippery concept, in no small part due
to the fact that it has been defined in many different ways over the years,45
“retribution” as used in this Article shall refer specifically to a theory of legal
punishment requiring that (a) a wrongdoer should only be punished for
breaching a legally recognized duty,46 (b) in proportion to the grievousness of
his wrong.47 The first prong of this definition focuses on the justification for
punishment and maintains that a wrongdoer may not be punished for the sole
purpose of compensating a victim, deterring a future wrongdoer, or even
45 In a well-known article, John Cottingham offered at least nine separate versions of retributivist
theories. See John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979). The nine theories of
retributivism discussed were repayment theory, desert theory, penalty theory, minimalism, satisfaction theory,
fair play theory, placation theory, annulment theory, and denunciation theory. Id.
46 “Juridical [p]unishment . . . must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is
inflicted has committed a Crime.” KANT, supra note 15, at 195; see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING
BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 88 (1997) (“The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral
desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or her . . . .”); Hugo Adam Bedau, Concessions to
Retribution in Punishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 51, 52 (J.B. Cederblom & William L. Blizek eds.,
1977) (“[A] retributivist holds that a punishment is just if and only if the offender deserves it.”).
47 “[T]he mode and measure of Punishment which Public Justice takes as its Principle . . . is just the
Principle of Equality, by which the pointer of the Scale of Justice is made to incline no more to the one side
than the other.” KANT, supra note 15, at 196; see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart
of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the
criminal offender.”); IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1989) (listing the principle that
“[p]unishment ought to be proportionate to the offense” as one of the five fundamental tenets of
retributivism); Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 29, 32 (Paul Edwards
ed., 1967) (noting that retributivism “insists that the punishment must fit the crime”); Joel Feinberg, The
Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 727, 728 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000) (“The
proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the morally guilty offender is that amount which fits,
matches, or is proportionate to the moral gravity of the offense.”); Kent Greenawalt, Commentary,
Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347–48 (1983) (observing that for retributivism, “the
severity of punishment should be proportional to the degree of wrongdoing”).
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protecting a future innocent victim. Rather, retributive punishment maintains
that a wrongdoer should only be punished for violating a legally recognized
duty that results in a wrongful harm to another party. The second prong of this
definition focuses on the scope of punishment called for in an individual case
and requires that the wrongdoer only be punished in proportion to the wrong
committed. Getting the scope or quantum of the remedy just right requires
thinking along the lines of Goldilocks: the judge must ensure both that the
wrongdoer not be treated too leniently (e.g., by letting the wrongdoer “off the
hook” by requiring him or her to pay a compensatory sum less than that
required to compensate the victim for the harm suffered) or too harshly (e.g.,
by sacrificing the wrongdoer on the altar of social justice for the sake of
deterring future wrongdoers from engaging in similar nefarious actions). By
keeping this working definition of retributive punishment in mind, I hope to
show, by way of example, that the principle of retribution is not only pervasive
in our public criminal law, as one might expect, but can also be found roaming
quite freely throughout the terrain of the private law, an idea that may well
surprise those who focus more on what courts say than on what courts do.
Like restorative remedies, retributive remedies may also take one of two
forms: substitutionary and in-kind. I suspect that most of us, when we think
about retributive remedies, think about the in-kind, eye-for-an-eye, talionic
punishments sanctioned by such ancient legal texts as Hammurabi’s Code,48
the Mosaic Law,49 and the Twelve Tables of Rome.50 Though Mahatma
Ghandi undoubtedly had these in-kind remedies in mind when he famously

48 See, e.g., THE CODE OF HAMMURABI 25 (L.W. King trans., 2011) (c. 1750 B.C.E.), available at
http://www.general-intelligence.com/library/hr.pdf (“If a man put out the eye of another man, his eye shall be
put out. [An eye for an eye].” (alteration in original)); id. (“If he break another man’s bone, his bone shall be
broken.”); id. (“If a man knock out the teeth of his equal, his teeth shall be knocked out. [A tooth for a tooth].”
(alteration in original)); id. at 27 (“If a builder build a house for some one, and does not construct it properly,
and the house which he built fall in and kill its owner, then that builder shall be put to death. If it kill the son of
the owner the son of that builder shall be put to death. If it kill a slave of the owner, then he shall pay slave for
slave to the owner of the house.”).
49 See, e.g., Exodus 21:23–25 (King James) (“And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for
life, Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, Burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for
stripe.”); Exodus 21:31 (King James) (“Whether he have gored a son, or have gored a daughter, according to
this judgment shall it be done unto him.”); Leviticus 24:19–20 (King James) (“And if a man cause a blemish in
his neighbour; as he hath done, so shall it be done to him; Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he
hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again.”); Deuteronomy 19:21 (King James) (“And
thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.”).
50 See, e.g., The Laws of the Twelve Tables, reprinted in 1 THE CIVIL LAW 57, 70 (S.P. Scott trans., AMS
Press 1973) (c. 450 B.C.E.) (“When anyone breaks a member of another, and is unwilling to come to make a
settlement with him, he shall be punished by the law of retaliation.”).
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quipped that an eye for an eye “ends in making everybody blind,”51 this
criticism fails to appreciate how well many in-kind retributive punishments
actually work; a retributive remedy that required a thief to return a stolen pair
of glasses to his victim would result in a remedy that made the world’s
collective eyesight better, not worse.52 Further, this criticism ignores
substitutionary retributive punishments, of which a large portion can be found
prominently throughout the private law of contracts, torts, and unjust
enrichment, not to mention the world of criminal law, where they reign
virtually supreme.
As mentioned earlier, the most obvious instance in which the principle of
retribution animates our private law is the area of punitive damages.53 Here,
courts recognize an interest in punishing wrongdoers who behave in a
reprehensible manner by acting “in reckless disregard of the consequences”
when the wrongdoer “likely knew or ought to have known . . . that his conduct
would naturally or probably result in injury,”54 or by showing, for example,
that the wrongdoer acted with a “‘willful and conscious disregard of the rights
or safety of others,’”55 a “‘conscious disregard for . . . a great probability of
causing substantial harm,’”56 “ill will” toward the victim, or behavior “so
outrageous that malice toward a person injured as a result of that conduct can
be implied.”57
But the notion of retribution is much more pervasive than would be
suggested by narrowly focusing on punitive damages. Consider, for instance,
51
52

THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 269 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
For a wonderful defense of talionic punishment in general, see WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE

(2006).
53 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) (“[T]he consensus today is that
punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 359 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] punitive damages award,
instead of serving a compensatory purpose, serves the entirely different purposes of retribution and deterrence
that underlie every criminal sanction.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003)
(“[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” (alteration in original) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996))); Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 (taking into account “the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct,” among other factors, in determining an appropriate punishment); Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (“[S]ubstantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the
case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights.”).
54 Union Pac. R.R. v. Barber, 149 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Ark. 2004).
55 Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 76 (Cal. 2005) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294(c)(1) (West 2004)).
56 Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 575 N.E.2d 416, 419 (Ohio 1991) (quoting Preston v. Murty,
512 N.E.2d 1174, 1174 (Ohio 1987)).
57 Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985).
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the realm of contract law, where, perhaps more than in any other substantive
area of the law, the role of punishment has long been thought to have no
place58 for at least two separate reasons. First, because it is sometimes thought
that the “duty to keep a contract” is merely “a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else,”59 it seems to follow that, so
long as the victim’s interest in restoration is protected in the event of breach
(e.g., through an award of compensatory damages), then the wrongdoer has
fulfilled his or her contractual duty, and there remains no harm for which
retributive punishment would be justified. Second, if we assume that the victim
has been fully compensated in the event of a wrongdoer’s breach, then the
principle of retribution would also have the deleterious effect of “deter[ring]
efficient . . . breaches, by making the cost of the breach to the contract breaker
greater than the cost of the breach to the victim.”60
58 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 4, intro. note (1981) (“‘Willful’
breaches have not been distinguished from other breaches . . . .”); HOLMES, supra note 31, at 236 (“The only
universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the
promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for
fulfil[l]ment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.”); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal
Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1970) (“In its essential design . . . our
system of remedies for breach of contract is one of strict liability and not of liability based on fault . . . .”).
59 Holmes, supra note 28, at 462; see also Norcia v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 80 F.
Supp. 2d 1047, 1048 (D. Ariz. 2000) (“[The] ‘bad man’ theory of contracts permeates American common law.
That is, a contracting party usually cannot demand performance of a valid contract; rather, the defaulting party
must either perform or pay damages equivalent to the value of the promised performance. Under this approach
to contract theory, it follows that when performance becomes uneconomic, a contracting party will not
infrequently break a contract, preferring instead to pay damages.”); Estate of Murrell v. Quin, 454 So. 2d 437,
440 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Fuzzy moral notions of right and
wrong, good and bad are irrelevant. That persons not parties to the contract may suffer loss is of no concern of
the law. . . . Persons potentially affected who have failed to act to protect their interests sit idle at their peril.
The law is wholly indifferent to non-legal consequences. It would allow one to think and behave as the
proverbial Holmesean bad man to his heart’s content.” (citing Holmes, supra note 28, at 459)); Clark A.
Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the Doctrine of Efficient Breach: Fine Tuning the
Notion of the Contract Breacher as Wrongdoer, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 647 (1999) (“The law has come to
regard the obligation to perform a contract as being generally equivalent to an option to perform or pay
damages. Holmes saw the matter this way more than one hundred years ago.”). The court in Norcia went on to
find that when a bad man breaches a contract, the only punishment is to pay damages, and nothing else.
Norcia, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (quoting Holmes, supra note 28, at 462); see also Redgrave v. Bos. Symphony
Orchestra, 602 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (D. Mass. 1985) (recognizing that “[t]he suggested freedom to break a
contract and suffer liability only for the legally recognized damages is within the scope of the idea often
referred to as Holmes’[s] bad man theory of contract law—that one who is willing to pay the penalty of such
damages as the law assesses is free to break the contract and pay” (citing Holmes, supra note 28, at 461–62)),
aff’d in part and vacated in part, 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988) (en banc).
60 POSNER, supra note 44, at 127–28. Standard economic analysis suggests that the goal of contract
remedies is “compensation and not compulsion.” See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, § 12.3, at 737.
Because of this, promisors who breach for financial reasons “should not be dealt with harshly,” concepts like
punitive damages have no place in contract law because they will “encourage performance when breach would
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Nevertheless, even in the law of contracts, the principle of retribution does
play a prominent role and is often needed to make sense of numerous remedial
decisions made by courts. Consider, for instance, the famous 1921 case of
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,61 in which the parties entered into a contract
pursuant to which the plaintiff–builder, Jacob & Youngs, agreed to build a
country residence for the defendant–homeowner, Kent.62 In their contract,
Jacob & Youngs further promised to install only pipe manufactured by the
Reading Pipe Company.63 The defendant completed the construction, but
throughout much of the house unintentionally installed Cohoes pipe, which
was of the same quality, appearance, market value, and cost as Reading pipe.64
After Kent took possession of the residence, he discovered that some of the
pipe did not conform to the contract, claimed that Jacob & Youngs failed to
satisfy a condition in the contract, and refused to pay the balance due.65
Judge Cardozo, writing for the court, found that although Jacob & Youngs
breached the contract by failing to install the specific brand of pipe requested
by the defendant, its mistake was both unintentional and harmless.66 Therefore,
according to Cardozo, the real issue was whether, in such a situation, the court
should imply a condition, the nonsatisfaction of which would result in a

be socially more desirable,” and “‘[w]illful’ breaches should not be distinguished from other breaches.” Id.;
see also POSNER, supra note 44, at 94–142.
61 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
62 Id. at 890.
63 Id. Specifically, the contract said that “[a]ll wrought-iron pipe must be well galvanized, lap welded
pipe of the grade known as ‘standard pipe’ of Reading manufacture.” Id. Another provision in the contract
specifically required that “[a]ny work furnished by the Contractor, the material or workmanship of which is
defective or which is not fully in accordance with the drawings and specifications, in every respect, will be
rejected and is to be immediately torn down, removed, and remade or replaced in accordance with the
drawings and specifications, whenever discovered.” RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE
888 (4th ed. 2008).
64 Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 890. As noted by Carol Chomsky:
Some manufacturers used names for their pipe that makers of ‘genuine wrought iron pipe’
thought misleading. In order to avoid confusion, trade publications suggested specifying a
particular manufacturer that was known to produce pipe of the quality desired so that only pipe of
that standard would be used. The contract between Kent and Jacob & Youngs also contained
language suggesting that the specification of Reading pipe was meant only to specify a standard,
not to require absolutely that no other brand be used.
Carol Chomsky, Of Spoil Pits and Swimming Pools: Reconsidering the Measure of Damages for Construction
Contracts, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1445, 1447 n.11 (1991) (citing RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN
CONTRACT LAW 122 (1978)).
65 Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 890.
66 Id. Further bolstering the builder’s claim was the fact that the Cohoes pipe that was installed was of the
same quality, appearance, market value, and cost as Reading pipe. Id.
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forfeiture, or whether the court should merely find that Jacob & Youngs
breached the contract (but did not violate an implied condition), and hold it
liable for compensatory damages. In a memorable passage, Cardozo wrote:
The courts never say that one who makes a contract fills the measure
of his duty by less than full performance. They do say, however, that
an omission, both trivial and innocent, will sometimes be atoned for
by allowance of the resulting damage, and will not always be the
breach of a condition to be followed by a forfeiture. The distinction is
akin to that between dependent and independent promises, or
67
between promises and conditions.

Framed in such a manner, the issue that now confronted Judge Cardozo
was whether the language in the contract constituted (a) a condition that had
not been satisfied, in which case Jacob & Youngs would not be entitled to
recover the balance due under the contract unless it replaced the
nonconforming pipe with Reading pipe, or (b) a promise that had been
breached, in which case Jacob & Youngs could recover the balance due under
the contract, but would be liable to Kent for any damages he might have
suffered due to the installation of nonconforming pipe. In making this
determination, Cardozo set forth the following rubric for distinguishing
conditions from promises:
Some promises are so plainly independent that they can never by fair
construction be conditions of one another. Others are so plainly
dependent that they must always be conditions. Others, though
dependent and thus conditions when there is departure in point of
substance, will be viewed as independent and collateral when the
departure is insignificant. Considerations partly of justice and partly
of presumable intention are to tell us whether this or that promise
68
shall be placed in one class or in another.

Here, because Cardozo found that considerations of justice (the departure
was insignificant in point of substance, the defect was insignificant in its
relation to the project, and the cost of replacing the nonconforming pipe was
great) and presumable intention (the breach was unintentional rather than
willful) favored Jacob & Youngs, Cardozo held that the language used in the
contract requesting Reading pipe was a promise, rather than a condition, and
that Jacob & Youngs was entitled to payment of the balance due under the

67
68

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
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contract.69 Because Jacob & Youngs breached, however, they were still liable
to Kent for money damages. In determining the measure of those damages,
Cardozo wrote:
[T]he measure of the allowance is not the cost of replacement, which
would be great, but the difference in value, which would be either
nominal or nothing. . . . The owner is entitled to the money which
will permit him to complete, unless the cost of completion is grossly
70
and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be attained.

Here, because the breach was insignificant, and because the difference
between these two measures of damages was disproportional, Kent could only
recover diminution in value damages (i.e., the difference in value between the
house with Reading pipe and the house with Cohoes pipe) rather than the more
generous cost of completion damages (i.e., the amount it would cost Kent to
tear out the nonconforming Cohoes pipe and replace it with Reading pipe).71
Because Cohoes and Reading pipe were of the same quality, appearance,
value, and cost, the expectation damages awarded by the court “would be
either nominal or nothing.”72
This case, and others like it,73 is commonly understood by many
commentators as presenting a choice between two different measures of
expectation damages—cost of completion versus diminution in value—both of
which are restorative (quadrant I) in that they attempt to measure the injured
party’s loss by restoring that party to the position he or she would have
occupied but for the breach.74 Viewed in this manner, the case seems to read
like other contracts cases in which the court is confronted with a policy choice
between two different measures of a restorative remedy, both of which are

69

See id. at 891.
Id.
71 See id.
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 238 (Minn. 1939); Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal
& Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1962); Eastlake Constr. Co. v. Hess, 686 P.2d 465, 470 (Wash. 1984)
(en banc).
74 See, e.g., Eric G. Andersen, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of Contracts, 21 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1073, 1095 n.71 (1988) (describing Jacob & Youngs, Inc., Groves, and Peevyhouse as cases in which
“the issue is not whether to award damages sufficient to put the victim of the breach in the same position as if
the contract had been performed,” for this is a given, but rather determining “how to measure or define that
position”); Chomsky, supra note 64, at 1450–51 (“When choosing a remedy, a court aims primarily to
compensate the injured party adequately—to place her in as good a position as if the contract had been
performed—while avoiding overcompensation.” (footnote omitted)).
70
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completely within the purview of quadrant I.75 Faced with this decision—
again, still viewing the problem through the lens of restoration—it does not
seem unreasonable to make this policy choice on economic (or other) grounds.
Thus, according to some commentators, where the “[l]oss in value to the
owner is likely to be only a small fraction of the cost to complete,” then
“diminution in market price [is] probably the better approximation of this
loss.”76 Not only is it frequently thought that a cost of completion remedy
might lead, in some cases, to “economic waste,”77 but even where it does not,
such a remedy may be criticized as “result[ing] in a ‘windfall’ to the injured
party.”78
On the other hand, many of these same commentators also recognize that
where diminution in value damages do not fully reflect the loss suffered by the
promisee, it will result in undercompensation.79 Like the notion of “windfall”
discussed above, this too is unacceptable if the goal is restoration. Quadrant I’s
lens of restoration, then, seems to provide no clear answers to distinguish
between cost of completion and diminution in value cases, and has even led
some commentators to suggest that we might resolve the issue by splitting the
remedial baby:
Rather than accept the draconian choice between overcompensation
through cost [of completion] and undercompensation through
diminution in market price, the trier of the facts ought to be allowed
at least to fix an intermediate amount as its best estimate, in the light
80
of all the circumstances, of the loss in value to the injured party.

This approach, however, seems to be without a principled justification, as it
seems to advocate awarding a remedy in between two principled amounts for
the sake of awarding a remedy, rather than forcing courts to grapple with the
underlying justification for the remedy itself. Unlike King Solomon, whose
order to split the baby achieved justice precisely because it was not carried

75

See supra note 73.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, § 12.13, at 789–90 (second emphasis added).
77 See, e.g., Cnty. of Maricopa v. Walsh & Oberg Architects, Inc., 494 P.2d 44, 47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
(“The conceptual defense of economic waste has been recognized in Arizona.”).
78 FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, § 12.13, at 790.
79 See, e.g., id. (“On the other hand, the less generous measure may deprive the injured party of
compensation for some of the loss in value if that loss is not fully reflected in the diminution in market
price.”).
80 Id.
76
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out,81 a “splitting the baby” remedy, if carried out (either by King Solomon,
then, or by a judge, today), would seem to result in injustice because it would
give to one party only half as much as that party deserved while leaving the
wrongdoing party with a half share too much. Might there be a better solution
to this problem?
This Article suggests that the answer is yes: the seemingly intractable
problem presented by Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent and other similar cases
seems to be an illusion created by viewing the problem exclusively through the
restorative lens itself, which becomes obfuscated when presented with legal
problems that cannot clearly be discerned through the lens by which it is
viewed. By changing our remedial lens, however, and viewing these problems
through other remedial lenses (e.g., the quadrant II lens of retribution), these
seemingly thorny remedial questions become both clearer and more interesting
as well.
So how might our analysis of the remedial problem set forth in Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent be affected by viewing the matter through a different
remedial lens—say, the retributive lens? First of all, such an approach would
invite the judge to consider, for instance, the fact that a cost of completion
remedy, rather than overcompensating the victim, may be just what was
necessary to take ill-gotten gains from a wrongdoing party; or that a
diminution in value remedy, rather than undercompensating a victim, may be
one way for a court to ensure that no more is taken from a relatively innocent
wrongdoing party than what is absolutely necessary. So, for example, by
taking the retributive interest seriously, we could look at a case like Jacob &
Youngs with fresh eyes, and would reexamine Cardozo’s rhetoric concerning
the cause of the default, the willfulness of the breach, and the builder’s
insistence to exercise its own discretion by installing pipe it perceived to be
“‘just as good’”82 not as the obscure and peripheral musings of an all-too-

81 See 1 Kings 3:16–28 (New American Bible). The story of King Solomon proceeds as follows: Two
prostitutes came before King Solomon for a judgment, each claiming to be the mother of a baby. King
Solomon requested a sword, and gave the order to “[c]ut the living child in two, and give half to one woman
and half to the other.” One woman was mortified, and pleaded with Solomon: “Please, my lord, give her the
living child—please do not kill it!” The other woman, however, said, “It shall be neither mine nor yours.
Divide it!” King Solomon then rendered his verdict, saying, “Give the first one the living child! By no means
kill it, for she is the mother.” We are told that “[w]hen all Israel heard the judgment the king had given, they
were in awe of him, because they saw that the king had in him the wisdom of God for giving judgment.” Id.
82 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (quoting Easthampton Lumber & Coal
Co. v. Worthington, 79 N.E. 323, 324 (N.Y. 1906)).
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clever judge (as it often seems to my students when viewed through the
restorative lens of compensation).
Instead, when viewed through the retributive lens, such rhetoric becomes
central to unlocking the case’s meaning. Words that otherwise seemed strange
and aberrational in the context of contract law,83 such as Cardozo’s refusal to
visit this particular builder’s “venial faults with oppressive retribution” while
admonishing others that “[t]he willful transgressor must accept the penalty of
his transgression,”84 are given new meaning and hold a potentially powerful
sway over private law. By recasting Jacob & Youngs as a case not only (or
even primarily) about restoration, but also about retribution, it reveals that
punishing the breaching party by taking from the wrongdoer what the
wrongdoer himself took from the injured party (i.e., Reading pipe, measured
by the cost of completion remedy) is not warranted where the breach was both
unintentional and trivial.
If this is correct, and courts take seriously the notion of retributive relief in
private law, then there should be instances in which courts, when faced with a
choice between two different restorative remedies, decide the issue on
retributive grounds by punishing more severely defendants who intentionally
breached their contracts, or otherwise behaved badly, by taking from the
wrongdoing parties what they themselves have taken from their victim, either
in-kind or substitutionarily, by way of a dollar equivalent. A perfect test case,
it would seem, would be one in which a judge would seem to be guided by
retributive concerns and where an intentional breach is both trivial and
incidental to the main purpose of the contract, and even more conclusive still
would be a case in which the cost of completion damages are grossly
disproportional to the diminution in value damages. The law, it turns out, is
replete with such cases.85

83 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, § 12.3, at 737. Farnsworth noted that standard economic analysis
suggests that the goal of contract remedies is “compensation and not compulsion.” Id. Because of this,
promisors who breach for financial reasons “should not be dealt with harshly,” concepts like punitive damages
have no place in contract law because they will “encourage performance when breach would be socially more
desirable,” and “‘[w]illful’ breaches should not be distinguished from other breaches.” Id.; see also POSNER,
supra note 44, at 93–142.
84 Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 891.
85 In addition to numerous material breach cases with fact patterns similar to Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v.
Kent, Section 39 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment would go even further
toward punishing intentional breaches by forcing promisors to disgorge any profits from their opportunistic
breaches. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRIDCHMENT § 39, at 646 (2011) (“If a
deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting promisor and the available damage remedy
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Consider, for instance, Groves v. John Wunder Co.86 In this case, the
plaintiff owned a tract of land on which there were deposits of sand and gravel
and a plant for excavating and screening the gravel.87 The defendant leased the
land from the plaintiff for $105,000 to remove the sand and gravel and
promised to leave the property at a uniform grade.88 After removing the richest
gravel, the defendant deliberately breached the contract by refusing to restore
the land to a uniform grade at a cost $60,000, when it realized that the value of
the land if restored would only be $12,160.89 Not surprisingly, the defendant
argued along the lines of the principle established in Jacob & Youngs that a
cost of completion remedy should not be awarded where it was
disproportionate to a diminution in value award.90
Here, once again, the court was ostensibly confronted with a choice
between two different measures of restoration. However, unlike the builder in
Jacob & Youngs, which Cardozo found to have acted unintentionally, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota found the defendant’s breach in Groves to be
“wil[l]ful,” and therefore opted to restore the plaintiff to its rightful position
through the more generous cost of completion damages.91
If we try to explain such cases on restorative grounds, the problem, as
previously suggested, becomes intractable: we can either pretend that both cost
of completion and diminution in value damages are equally (and fully)
compensatory and ignore the (usually obvious) differences between them, or
we can recognize that the courts in such cases are being confronted with a
difficult choice between overcompensation and undercompensation92 without
affords inadequate protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement, the promisee has a claim to restitution
of the profit realized by the promisor as a result of the breach.”).
86 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939).
87 Id. at 235.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 236.
90 Id. at 242 (Olson, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 236 (majority opinion).
92 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 44, at 121 (“It is true that not enforcing the contract would have given
the defendant a windfall. But enforcing the contract gave the plaintiff an equal and opposite windfall . . . .”);
see also Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534–35 (9th Cir. 1962) (“The question [regarding
the collateral source rule] is not whether a windfall is to be conferred, but rather who shall receive the benefit
of a windfall which already exists. As between the injured person and the tortfeasor, the former’s claim is the
better. This may permit a double recovery, but it does not impose a double burden. The tortfeasor bears only
the single burden for his wrong. That burden is imposed by society, not only to make the plaintiff whole, but
also to deter negligence and encourage due care. . . . Collateral source funds are . . . . intended for the benefit
of the injured person, and not for that of the person who injures him. That intention should be effectuated.”). In
Gypsum Carrier, we see clearly the court’s concern with the retributive interest, both in terms of making sure
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any (restorative) way of choosing between the two different measures. We can
also, I suppose, try to attribute the court’s decision to remedial discretion; this
is probably what is intended when this case is discussed by authors alongside
the likes of Jacob & Youngs and distinguished by a “cf.” signal. This, too,
seems unsatisfactory, and reminds one of the unprincipled “split the baby”
approach discussed above.93
However, if we allow for the possibility that the retributive interest is
playing a role here, and take seriously the suggestion that courts are moved by
the fact that the defendant’s breach ought to be punished more severely when it
is willful and in bad faith,94 then this case, and others like it,95 suddenly fall
into place.
Furthermore, these cases cut sharply against the so-called Holmesian view
of contracts,96 which holds that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law
means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and
nothing else.”97 The law, it turns out, suggests something quite different:

that, as between an innocent and wrongdoing party, the wrongdoer pays for his wrong (“[c]ollateral source
funds are . . . . intended for the benefit of the injured person, and not for that of the person who injures him”),
and in terms of ensuring that the wrongdoer does not pay either too much or too little for his wrong (“[t]he
tortfeasor bears only the single burden for his wrong”). Id. Remarkably, the court seemed to be confronted
with a choice of selecting between a restorative or retributive remedy, and came down on the side of the latter
(“[a]s between the injured person and the tortfeasor, the former’s claim is the better”), even where this leads to
over-protection of the restorative interest (i.e., a “windfall”). Id. The case is also interesting in that it also
touches on the relationship between the restorative and retributive interests to the coercive interest (“[t]hat
burden is imposed by society, not only to make the plaintiff whole, but also to deter negligence and encourage
due care”), id., an idea that will be further pursued in Part III.
93 See supra text accompanying note 81.
94 See, e.g., Groves, 286 N.W. at 236; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 39, at 646 (2011).
95 See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 263, 265 (1946) (awarding
compensatory damages that were “speculative and uncertain” because “the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the
uncertainty which his own wrong has created”); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1948)
(paying homage to the traditional rule that “[a] party may have specific performance of a contract for the sale
of chattels if the legal remedy is inadequate,” but noting that there is “no reason why a court should be
reluctant to grant specific relief when it can be given without supervision of the court or other time-consuming
processes against one who has deliberately broken his agreement,” and denying specific performance on other
grounds (emphasis added)).
96 There is some debate as to whether this was actually Holmes’s view or not. As I have argued
elsewhere, Holmes should probably be understood as making a descriptive point, rather than a normative one,
and was merely describing what contract law looks like when viewed through the bad man’s eyes. See Marco
Jimenez, Finding the Good in Holmes’s Bad Man, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069 (2011).
97 Holmes, supra note 28, at 462; see also HOLMES, supra note 31, at 300–01 (“It is true that in some
instances equity does what is called compelling specific performance. But . . . . [t]his remedy is an exceptional
one. The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay
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although the breach of a legal duty will almost always invoke society’s interest
in restoring a victim to its rightful position, society’s interest in retribution
(varying in proportion to the wrongfulness of the wrongdoer’s breach) will
sometimes outweigh society’s interest in restoration, even in a field as
seemingly divorced from punishment as contract law.98
Outside of contract law, of course, the case for retributive punishment is
even easier to establish.99 In the law of unjust enrichment, for example, courts
damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until
the time for fulfillment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.”).
98 George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (1994) (“The
fundamental premise of most theories of contract damages has been that contract damage law is a ‘strict
liability’ system; that is, the reason the breach occurs does not matter in determining the measure of damages.
That premise is wrong. In fact, the reason the breach occurs has always influenced courts’ determination of the
proper measure of damages.” (footnote omitted)). But if punishment is sometimes appropriate in contract law,
how is one to explain the reluctance of courts to award punitive damages for ordinary contract breaches? In
fact, is not the purpose of punitive damages to punish and deter wrongdoers, rather than compensate victims,
whereas the stated purpose of contract damages is the exact opposite: to compensate the injured party, but not
to punish or deter?
Even here, where it is hard to imagine the remedial “rules” being any clearer, things are not what they
seem. Where a wrongdoer’s conduct is particularly egregious, courts will often find ways to punish the
wrongdoing party, either by “adjusting” the amount of “compensation” due, as discussed above, or by
“breaking the rules” of contract damages and awarding punitive damages where the breaches are particularly
egregious. See, e.g., Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 61 P.3d 557, 568 (Idaho 2002) (“[I]n breach of
contract cases . . . punitive damages might be appropriate if the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently
egregious.”); Brown v. Fritz, 699 P.2d 1371, 1377 (Idaho 1985) (“[W]hen damages are sought for breach of a
contractual relationship, there can be no recovery for emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff. If the conduct
of a defendant has been sufficiently outrageous, we view the proper remedy to be in the realm of punitive
damages.”); Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 880 P.2d 300, 307 (N.M. 1994) (“[A]n award of punitive
damages in a breach-of-contract case must be predicated on a showing of bad faith, or at least a showing that
the breaching party acted with reckless disregard for the interests of the nonbreaching party.”).
While a mere breach of conduct will not imply a basis for punitive damages, “[a] mental state
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages will exist when the defendant acts with ‘reckless disregard’
for the rights of the plaintiff—i.e., when the defendant knows of potential harm to the interests of the plaintiff
but nonetheless ‘utterly fail[s] to exercise care’ to avoid the harm.” Id. at 308 (alteration in original). The court
in Paiz went on to emphasize that while the general rule is that breach-of-contract damages are limited to
compensatory damages, courts have employed “a narrow exception . . . by penalizing conduct that constitutes
a ‘wanton disregard’ for the nonbreaching party’s rights, or ‘bad faith,’ with an award of punitive damages.”
Id. at 309. A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will be found if “one party
wrongfully and intentionally used the contract to the detriment of the other party” where the breaching party
“is consciously aware of, and proceeds with deliberate disregard for, the potential of harm to the other party.”
Id. at 309–10. Although the court ultimately found that punitive damages were not proper in this case because
there was a finding of only negligence, there is a wonderful discussion of when punitive damages for breach of
contract would be appropriate. See id. at 307; see also Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 1997 SD 121,
573 N.W.2d 493.
99 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (noting that Section
4 of the Clayton Act is a “remedial provision” that, by allowing treble damages, plays “an important role in
penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing”).
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frequently take into account the culpability of the wrongdoer in awarding an
appropriate remedy, and it is hard to deny (though courts and commentators
sometimes do so)100 that the notion of punishment is playing a significant
role.101 Consider, for instance, the case of Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.,102 in
which the plaintiff sold his interest in an egg-packing business to the
defendant, but retained ownership of an egg-washing machine that was
formerly used by the business, which the plaintiff stored in a space adjacent to
the defendant’s premises.103 Unknown to the plaintiff, the defendant began
using the plaintiff’s egg-washing machine to cut down on the cost of labor.104
When the plaintiff learned of this fact several years later, he offered to sell the
machine to the defendant, but the parties could not agree on a price.105 The
plaintiff then brought an action in unjust enrichment to recover “the reasonable
value of [the] defendant’s use of the machine.”106
Although the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s remedy should be limited
to replevin or the rental value of the machine107 (both of which would fall into
In his empirical examination of cases involving the granting or denial of injunctions involving
violations of building restrictions, Professor Van Hecke found that the fact “[m]ost frequently and significantly
relied upon as an affirmative basis for injunction was the defendant’s willfulness. The cases abound with such
appraisals as deliberate, defiant, flagrant, intentional, premeditated, and at his peril.” M. T. Van Hecke,
Injunctions to Remove or Remodel Structures Erected in Violation of Building Restrictions, 32 TEX. L. REV.
521, 530 (1954).
100 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51, at 203 (2011) (“The
object of restitution . . . is to eliminate profit from wrongdoing while avoiding, so far as possible, the
imposition of a penalty.”).
101 See, e.g., id. § 1 cmt. d at 8 (“Restitution may strip a wrongdoer of all profits gained in a
transaction . . . but principles of unjust enrichment will not support the imposition of a liability that leaves an
innocent recipient worse off . . . .”). However, where the transferee is guilty of fault, the tables turn quickly.
See, e.g., id. § 49, reporter’s note a at 184 (noting where the plaintiff has lost more than the wrongdoer has
gained, “the measure of restitution is determined with reference to the tortiousness of the defendant’s conduct
or the negligence or other fault of one or both of the parties in creating the situation giving rise to the right to
restitution”). In addition:
If the defendant was tortious in his acquisition of the benefit he is required to pay for what the
other has lost although that is more than the recipient benefited. If he was consciously tortious in
acquiring the benefit, he is also deprived of any profit derived from his subsequent dealing with
it.
Id.; see also id. § 51, at 203 (“[T]he unjust enrichment of a conscious wrongdoer . . . is the net profit
attributable to the underlying wrong . . . .”); id. (“The object of restitution in such cases is to eliminate profit
from wrongdoing while avoiding, so far as possible, the imposition of a penalty.”).
102 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 652–53.
105 Id. at 653.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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the restorative remedies of quadrant I), the trial court sided with the plaintiff,
and the decision was affirmed on appeal. The court held:
Actions for restitution have for their primary purpose taking
from the defendant and restoring to the plaintiff something to which
the plaintiff is entitled, or if this is not done, causing the defendant to
pay the plaintiff an amount which will restore the plaintiff to the
108
position in which he was before the defendant received the benefit.

If the value of the gain to the defendant was always equal to the loss to the
plaintiff, the court reasoned, there would be no substantial problem as to the
amount of recovery, since actions seeking restitution would be equivalent to
actions seeking money damages.109 However, in cases such as this one, where
the amount of gain realized by the defendant is not identical to the loss
sustained by the plaintiff, “the measure of restitution is determined with
reference to the tortiousness of the defendant’s conduct or the negligence or
other fault of one or both of the parties in creating the situation giving rise to
the right to restitution.”110 Here, because the defendant was tortious in its
acquisition of the benefit of the egg-washing machine, the court required the
defendant to disgorge this benefit, even though the amount of the defendant’s
gain far exceeded the plaintiff’s loss.111
Another illuminating example is provided by the twin cases of Edwards v.
Lee’s Administrator112 and Beck v. Northern Natural Gas Co.,113 which, like
Jacob & Youngs and Groves, are remarkably similar in regard to all relevant
facts save one: the culpability of the wrongdoing party. In Edwards, the “Great
Onyx Cave” lay beneath the land of two separate landowners, Edwards and

108 Id. at 654 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ch.
8, topic 2, intro. note at 595–96 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109 Id.
110 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ch. 8, topic
2, intro. note at 596 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111 Id. (“If he was consciously tortious in acquiring the benefit, he is also deprived of any profit derived
from his subsequent dealing with it.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI
CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ch. 8, topic 2, intro. note at 596 (1937)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Interestingly, toward the end of the opinion, the court attempted to justify its remedy by speaking in
terms of awarding “the measure of restoration” needed to make the plaintiff whole, although it is clear
throughout the opinion that the court was attempting no such thing: rather than restoring the plaintiff to his
rightful position via an award of compensatory damages (a quadrant I remedy), the court was clearly focused
on removing the wrongdoing party from the position it wrongfully occupied by forcing it to disgorge its gains
to the plaintiff (a quadrant II remedy). Id.
112 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936).
113 170 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Lee.114 Edwards discovered an entry to the cave on his land and began to
“embark upon a program of advertising and exploitation for the purpose of
bringing visitors to his cave.”115 Specifically, Edwards built a hotel near the
mouth of the cave, improved and widened the footpaths and avenues in the
cave, and led tours through the cave, making enough money “not only to cover
the cost of operation, but also to yield a substantial revenue in addition
thereto.”116 The visitors, however, were led not only through the portion of the
cave beneath Edward’s land, but through the portion of the cave beneath Lee’s
land as well, which could only be accessed through Edward’s entrance.117
When Lee learned of this fact, he brought suit for trespass and sought damages,
an injunction preventing further trespasses, and an accounting for profits
resulting from operation of the cave.118 Although the cave under Lee’s land
was not damaged in any way, and although it could be accessed only via
Edward’s entrance, the court nevertheless forced Edwards to disgorge to Lee a
pro-rata portion of his net profits, in large part because Edwards knew of the
trespass to Lee’s land, and, the court reasoned, the law should not allow such a
wrongdoer to profit from his own wrong.119
The trespass issue was nearly identical in Beck, but the defendant’s
culpability, and therefore the remedy that was awarded, was quite different. In
Beck, Northern Natural Gas Company (Northern) obtained storage rights to the
Viola formation underlying 23,000 acres of property.120 After Northern began
storing gas, “some of the gas vertically migrated from the Viola to the Simpson
formation, a smaller formation directly beneath the Viola.”121 Once Northern
learned of this fact, it thoroughly evaluated the Simpson formation, and
obtained lease agreements from two-thirds of the affected landowners,
exercising its eminent domain power against the others, including the
plaintiffs.122 As in Edwards, the plaintiffs brought an action for “trespass and
unjust enrichment related to the migration of gas to the Simpson formation”123
and sought a pro-rata portion of the profits Northern gained as a result of

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

96 S.W.2d at 1029.
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1029.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1030, 1032–33 (“[A] wrongdoer shall not be permitted to make a profit from his own wrong.”).
Beck v. N. Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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storing gas in the Simpson formation.124 The court, however, refused to award
such a remedy, holding that “[t]he benefit that Northern received from the
landowners was the use of the Simpson formation without payment of rent, for
which the proper measure of damages was, as the district court found, fair
rental value.”125 The court attempted to distinguish this case from others
awarding disgorgement to the plaintiff on the ground that, but for the
defendant’s actions in making use of the land, profits would not have gone to
the original landowners.126
This reasoning, of course, cannot explain what is really driving the court’s
decision, in that it ignores the fact that the plaintiffs in both Olwell and
Edwards also would not have gained any profits but for the actions of the
defendant. A better explanation seems to be that the culpability of the
defendants in Olwell and Edwards was much higher than the culpability of the
defendant in Beck, and the court was adjusting its remedy to punish more
severely the more culpable defendants, which is the principle at the heart of
retributive punishment.127 Making such allowances to account for the
culpability of the wrongdoing party, cases like those discussed above soon fall
in line.
Indeed, the new Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
takes one step forward in this direction by allowing courts to directly take into
account the wrongdoer’s culpability in determining the remedy to be awarded,
although it too strangely denies that what it is doing is punishing the culpable
party128—rejecting the explanation that seems to best explain the remedy. My
sense is that the defendants in such cases, and probably most individuals
without legal training, would see the matter quite differently and view a
remedy tied to the culpability of a defendant’s conduct in terms of retributive
punishment.

124

Id.
Id. at 1024.
126 Id.
127 Compare Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1030, 1032 (Ky. 1936) (describing the defendants
as willful trespassers and wrongdoers), and Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 653 (Wash. 1946)
(describing the defendant as acting without the plaintiff’s knowledge and benefiting “by his wrong”), with
Beck, 170 F.3d at 1021, 1024 (describing the defendant’s actions to prevent a problem and acknowledging a
limited scope of wrongdoing).
128 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51, at 203 (2011) (“The
object of restitution . . . is to eliminate profit from wrongdoing while avoiding, so far as possible, the
imposition of a penalty.”).
125
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C. The Coercive Interest
The business of government is to promote the happiness of the
society, by punishing and rewarding. . . . In proportion as an act tends
to disturb that happiness, in proportion as the tendency of it is
129
pernicious, will be the demand it creates for punishment.

– Jeremy Bentham
In contrast to the two remedial interests discussed above, both of which
took a backward-looking approach to remedies (from either a victim- or
wrongdoer-centered perspective), another principle by which the law of
remedies might be organized is the coercive interest (quadrant III).130 This
interest, made popular by utilitarians and, more recently, law and economics
scholars, takes a forward-looking, wrongdoer-centered approach to remedies
and focuses neither on what should be given to the victim by way of
restoration, nor on what should be taken from the wrongdoer by way of
retribution,131 at least not directly.132
Instead, the coercive approach advocates that remedies be chosen according
to whether they (a) effectively encourage efficient or socially productive
activity, on the one hand (i.e., positive coercion), or (b) deter inefficient or
socially unproductive conduct (i.e., labeling those who commit such acts as
wrongdoers), on the other (i.e., negative coercion).133 Thus, in sharp contrast to
129

BENTHAM, supra note 16, at 70.
I use the term coercion rather than deterrence because, from an economic standpoint, the law is
concerned not only with deterring inefficient activities, but also in encouraging efficient activities as well. See
POSNER, supra note 44, at 25 (“[T]he common law is best . . . explained as a system for maximizing the wealth
of society.”).
131 See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 32, at 226 (arguing that, in its pure form, “economic analysis suggests
that reprehensibility is irrelevant, and that underdeterrence is all that matters”).
132 BENTHAM, supra note 16, at 317. Whether punishment deters or not
130

depends altogether upon the expectation it raises of similar punishment, in future cases of similar
delinquency. But this future punishment . . . must always depend upon detection. If then the want
of detection is such as must in general . . . appear too improbable to be reckoned upon, the
punishment, though it should be inflicted, may come to be of no use.
Id. (emphasis added).
133 JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in A FRAGMENT ON
GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 113, 281 (Wilfrid
Harrison ed., Basil Blackwell Oxford 1948) (1789) [hereinafter BENTHAM, Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation] (noting the purpose of punishment is “to augment the total happiness of the
community; and therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, every thing that tends to subtract
from happiness: in other words, to exclude mischief”). According to Bentham, punishment was just one way of
“exclud[ing] mischief,” and other ways include preventing mischief, suppressing mischief by “disablement,”
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both the restorative134 and retributivist135 theories discussed above, the
coercive interest holds that the only “principle [that] justifies the infliction of
punishment” is the prevention of a legal wrong136 and the quantum of
punishment inflicted on the defendant should be also directed at the prevention
of a legal wrong, neither more nor less,137 “whether [this quantum] be
proportionable to the guilt of the [wrongdoer] or not.”138

and giving satisfaction for mischief already committed by “affording a pleasure or satisfaction to the party
injured.” Id. at 281 n.1 (emphasis omitted). Bentham’s concern in preventing mischief roughly corresponds
with what I have called the protection interest, and his concern with giving satisfaction for mischief committed
roughly corresponds with what I have called the restorative interest. Bentham’s concern with punishment,
however, is an essentially utilitarian one (its purpose is “to control action . . . . by its influence over [others’]
wills; in which case it is said to operate in the way of example”), and he does not seem to make room for a
utilitarian remedy outside the scope of punishment. Id. Further, Bentham’s theory distinguishes between two
types of punishment that are designed to achieve the broader goal of deterrence: “[p]articular prevention,”
which attempts to deter this particular wrongdoer by incapacitation, reformation, or intimidation, and “general
prevention,” which tends to make an example of this particular wrongdoer to deter others in society from
committing similar wrongful acts. See 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 365, 396 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, Simpkin, Marshall, & Co. 1843) [hereinafter
BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law]. I find Bentham’s terms particularly confusing, however, for they conflate
the notions of punishment, deterrence, and protection, which I have tried hard to separate in this Article. For
example, incapacitation is not inconsistent with Kant’s retributivist theory of punishment, without regard to
whether it has the wholesome utilitarian effect of deterrence; reformation can be achieved without recourse to
anything we would understand as punishment today (though punishment itself can certainly be one effective
method of reformation); and intimidation, if successful, can hardly be called punishment, for there need not
have been any wrongful act capable of punishment. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 178 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1789) [hereinafter BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION] (noting that punishment should be administered “to prevent, in as far as it is possible, and worth
while, all sorts of offences whatsoever”); PINCOFFS, supra note 17, at 86 (“The purpose of legal
punishment . . . for Bentham, [is] the prevention of crime.”).
134 The restorative view only allowed compensation to those suffering legal wrongs, and only in the
amount necessary to put them in the position they would have occupied but for the wrong. See supra Part II.A.
135 The retributive view required that punishment only be administered to a wrongdoer who has
committed a legal wrong, and only in proportion to the wrong he has inflicted on his victim. See supra Part
II.B.
136 PALEY, supra note 17, at 384; see also PINCOFFS, supra note 17, at 29 (“[T]raditional utilitarians hold
that punishment can be justified only by reference to prevention of crime.”).
137 See, e.g., BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 133, at 182 (“The
punishment ought in no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here
given.” (emphasis omitted)).
138 PALEY, supra note 17, at 384. Thus, as with retributivism, the utilitarian’s answer to the question of
how much we should punish is logically derived from his answer to the question of why we should punish in
the first place, but it is important to point out that the two ideas do not stand or fall together; a rejection of the
utilitarian principle of deterrence as a method for determining the quantum of punishment would not
undermine the claim that the justification for punishing a wrongdoer is to prevent wrongdoing.
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Along with retribution, the coercive interest (particularly in its negative
form emphasizing deterrence) has long influenced the field of criminal law,139
but has recently gained attention as a principle capable of organizing private
law remedies,140 mostly through the work of law and economics scholars.141
According to these scholars, remedies should be designed to achieve optimal
levels of deterrence by preventing inefficient breaches of legal duties.142 So,
for example, in the eyes of a law and economics scholar, “[t]he basic aim of
contract law . . . [should be] to deter people from behaving opportunistically
toward their contracting parties,”143 the basic aim of tort law should be “the
optimal reduction of accident costs,”144 and the basic aim of criminal law
should be “to prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary,
compensated exchange” so as “to promote economic efficiency.”145 This can
be done by setting the “remedy” equal to the amount of harm caused by the
wrongdoer, multiplied by the inverse of the probability of detection, which
would ensure that all nondetected wrongdoers would also be optimally
deterred.146

139 Id. at 383 (“The proper end of human punishment is, not the satisfaction of justice, but the prevention
of crimes.”); see supra Part II.B.
140 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 44, at 23 (noting that only “since about 1960” has modern law and
economics attempted to make sense of “the legal system across the board: to common law fields such as torts,
contracts, restitution, and property; to statutory fields such as environmental regulation and intellectual
property; to the theory and practice of punishment; to civil, criminal, and administrative procedure; to the
theory of legislation and regulation; to law enforcement and judicial administration; and even to constitutional
law, primitive law, admiralty law, family law, and jurisprudence”).
141 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 44.
142 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 512. More formally, “optimal deterrence occurs at the point
where the marginal social cost of reducing crime further equals the marginal social benefit.” Id.
143 POSNER, supra note 44, at 94 (footnote omitted).
144 JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL
THEORY 14 (2001); see also id. (“[E]conomic analysis explicates negligence in terms of the Learned Hand
formula. . . . Negligence is the imposition of unreasonable risks, and the criteria for the proper application of
the concept of a reasonable risk are given by the Learned Hand test. The Learned Hand test is itself simply an
expression of the economic goal of tort law, namely, the optimal reduction of accident costs.”); Patrick J.
Kelley, The Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 743
(2001) (“The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the
likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.” (quoting Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d
611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev’d, 312 U.S. 492 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985).
146 Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 396–97. This is because “deterrence,” as it is usually
understood, refers to both the specific deterrence of the wrongdoer, and the general deterrence of other
potential wrongdoers who are able to act with the benefit of the defendant’s example. See, e.g., JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2–3 (1990).
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Before looking at the relationship between the coercive interest and the
other two remedial interests we have discussed, it is worth pausing to examine
some of the areas in which the coercive interest has played a prominent role in
structuring our law of remedies. One area in which the coercive interest is
frequently acknowledged as a guiding remedial principle in private law is in
the realm of punitive damages.147 In case after case, courts have emphasized
the twin objectives of punitive damages awards: to punish the wrongdoing
party (a quadrant II activity) and deter potential future wrongdoers from
engaging in similar prohibited conduct (a quadrant III activity).148
Although the scope of this remedy has been reigned in in recent years,149
thereby constraining a court’s ability to achieve optimal deterrence,150 its
presence in our law is an important reminder that sometimes a remedy has as
its primary purpose neither restoration (quadrant I) nor retribution (quadrant
II), but coercion (quadrant III), usually in the form of deterring others from
engaging in socially harmful activity. In fact, one of the primary reasons for
the existence of this remedy is to operate in precisely those cases in which
restorative damages may be unavailable or, if available, inadequate to achieve
optimal deterrence.151
147 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (“[A] penalty should be
reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some
ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another.”).
148 See, e.g., id. at 2621 (“[T]he consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but
principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 359
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] punitive damages award, instead of serving a compensatory purpose,
serves the entirely different purposes of retribution and deterrence that underlie every criminal sanction.”);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“[T]he damages awarded [must] be reasonably
necessary to vindicate the State’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.”); Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (“[S]ubstantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the
case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights.”); Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382 (Ct. App. 1981) (“The primary purposes of punitive damages are
punishment and deterrence of like conduct by the wrongdoer and others.”).
149 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2633 (“[G]iven the need to protect against the
possibility . . . of awards that are unpredictable and unnecessary, either for deterrence or for measured
retribution, we consider that a 1:1 ratio . . . is a fair upper limit in . . . maritime cases.”); Philip Morris USA,
549 U.S. at 353 (prohibiting a jury from punishing a defendant for harm caused to non-party “strangers to the
litigation,” even when such punishment may be necessary to achieve optimal levels of deterrence); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process.”).
150 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 397 & n.33 (noting that optimal punitive damages would
require setting the “punitive multiple equal to the reciprocal of the enforcement error,” but that such an
approach may be unconstitutional under Philip Morris USA v. Williams).
151 See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003). In Mathias, a case
involving a motel infested with bedbugs, a punitive damages award of $186,000 was upheld, even though
compensatory damages were only $5,000, in part because “[t]he defendant’s behavior was outrageous . . . and
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Moving away from punitive damages, there are other areas in which the
coercive interest plays an important role in structuring remedies.152 But
perhaps nowhere is this truer than in the area of tort law, where law and
economics scholars have advocated that the principle of deterrence (which I
shall refer to more broadly as the principle of efficient coercion) reign over a
wide range of civil wrongs.153 Perhaps nowhere is this principle better
exemplified than in the Learned Hand formula.
First formally set forth in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,154 Judge
Learned Hand rejected the traditional “reasonable man” standard that seemed
to require a potential wrongdoer to view the law of negligence from the good

at the same time difficult to quantify because a large element of [the harm] was emotional.” Id. at 674, 677.
Judge Posner, writing for the court, justified the high ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in part by
noting:
The award of punitive damages in this case . . . serves the additional purpose of limiting the
defendant’s ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection and (private) prosecution. If a
tortfeasor is ‘caught’ only half the time he commits torts, then when he is caught he should be
punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away.
Id. at 677; see also Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Compensatory damages do not always
compensate fully. Because courts insist that an award of compensatory damages have an objective basis in
evidence, such awards are likely to fall short in some cases, especially when the injury is of an elusive or
intangible character. . . . [P]unitive damages are necessary in such cases in order to make sure that tortious
conduct is not underdeterred, as it might be if compensatory damages fell short of the actual injury inflicted by
the tort.”).
152 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (noting that Section
4 of the Clayton Act is a “remedial provision” that, by allowing treble damages, plays “an important role in
penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing”); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344
U.S. 228, 233 (1952) (“[A] rule of liability which merely takes away the profits from an infringement would
offer little discouragement to infringers.”); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that
although “[i]t may seem wrong to penalize the infringer for his superior efficiency and give the owner a
windfall,” this remedy “discourages infringement,” whereas a traditional award of compensatory damages
would “not effectively deter this kind of forced exchange”); Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling
Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 123 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that the remedy of “accountings of profits would, by
removing the motive for infringements, have the effect of deterring future infringements”).
153 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 9,
85–86 (1987) (noting that although “most lawyers and law professors still believe . . . that the actual as well as
the ideal function of tort law is to achieve fairness rather than efficiency,” in fact “something like the Hand
formula has long been used to decide negligence cases,” and “Hand was purporting only to make explicit what
had long been the implicit meaning of negligence”).
154 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 153, at 9, 85–86 (observing
that although “most lawyers and law professors still believe . . . that the actual as well as the ideal function of
tort law is to achieve fairness rather than efficiency,” in fact “something like the Hand formula has long been
used to decide negligence cases,” and “Hand was purporting only to make explicit what had long been the
implicit meaning of negligence”).
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man’s internal point of view155 and provided the following external standard by
which courts should determine whether or not a defendant had acted
negligently:
[An] owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against
resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability
[of harm]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, [if the harm comes
about]; [and] (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it
serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether
156
B < PL.

155 See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 144, at 749–50. Professor Kelley has noted that just as “[t]he critical
question for Holmes . . . was not simple foreseeability by the ordinary reasonable man, but the specific laws of
antecedence and consequence that enable us to foresee harm from certain conduct under certain
circumstances,” so too did Judge Hand, a “friend and admirer of Holmes,” “refus[e] to include foreseeability in
his simplified reformulation of the unreasonable foreseeable risk test.” Id. The result was a test that was “more
scientific: you do not need to use that weaselly creature, the ordinary reasonable man, with his penchant for
sentiment and outmoded custom, who may upset the purely objective calculation of costs and benefits.” Id. But
see Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person
Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 817 (2001) (noting that, although the reasonable person test
and the Hand formula can be thought of “as independent and alternative techniques for determining
negligence,” the two can also be combined “by characterizing the Hand [f]ormula as the test a reasonable
person would use in deciding which precautions to take to avoid accident risks to others”).
156 Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173. As pointed out by Professor Kelley, “Judge Hand had expressed
this same understanding of the appropriate test of negligence, without the algebraic notation, over six years
before in Conway v. O’Brien.” Kelley, supra note 144, at 743; see also Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612
(2d Cir. 1940) (“The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the
likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.”), rev’d, 312 U.S. 492 (1941);
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 370 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding Ford to have engaged in costbenefit analysis in deciding whether to spend money to improve safety of Ford Pinto to reduce costs resulting
from accident-related injuries and deaths); Kelley, supra note 144, at 754 (“Judge Posner recognized the
Carroll Towing Co. negligence formula as ‘a valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors that are relevant
to a judgment of negligence and about the relationship among those factors’ even though ‘the formula does not
yield mathematically precise results in practice, [since the burden of precautions, and the probability and
potential gravity of harm have never all been quantified] in an actual lawsuit.’” (alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th
Cir. 1982))); Posner, supra note 13, at 32–33 (“Hand was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic
meaning of negligence. Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident if it occurs by the probability of
occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to be anticipated from incurring the costs necessary to
prevent the accident. The cost of prevention is what Hand meant by the burden of taking precautions against
the accident. . . . If the cost of safety measures or of curtailment—whichever cost is lower—exceeds the
benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society would be better off, in economic
terms, to forgo accident prevention. A rule making the enterprise liable for the accidents that occur in such
cases cannot be justified on the ground that it will induce the enterprise to increase the safety of its operations.
When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay
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Under this approach, which appears in our common law157 and is reflected
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts,158 a court need “merely calculate[] the
costs and the benefits of an activity to decide whether an injurer [is]
negligent,”159 and need not be concerned with determining what a
reasonable160 person in a defendant’s position would have foreseen or whether

tort judgments to the accident victims rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability.” (footnote
omitted)).
157 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1037–38 (1991)
(“[T]he process of balancing the magnitude of the risk against the cost of risk prevention has been embedded
in negligence law since the nineteenth century, and was rendered official by the First Restatement of Torts and
Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.” (footnote omitted)). But see Gilles, supra
note 155, at 814 (arguing that although the Restatement (Third) of Torts has explicitly adopted the Hand
formula, the cost-benefit approach of risk-utility balancing has been an implicit aspect of the reasonable person
standard for seventy years); Kelley, supra note 144, at 752–53 (“Stephen Gilles has confirmed what this author
had earlier suggested: judges ordinarily instruct juries on the negligence issue to determine whether the actor
behaved as a ‘reasonably prudent person’ or an ‘ordinary reasonable person.’ Judges do not ordinarily instruct
juries on the negligence issue to balance the costs and benefits of greater care.” (footnotes omitted)); Kenneth
W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1183 (2008) (“To be sure, there is much controversy about the descriptive claim that the
Hand test reflects Anglo-American tort law. Jury instructions (except in some products liability cases) rarely
refer to Hand balancing, and appellate decisions refer to such balancing only intermittently. Rather,
‘reasonable care under the circumstances’ appears to be the (remarkably vague and opaque) ‘standard’ that
many jurisdictions require juries to apply in determining negligence.” (footnotes omitted)).
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (2010) (“A person acts negligently if the person does not
exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the
person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or
reduce the risk of harm.”). It may have been the case, however, that Judge Learned Hand was himself
influenced by the ALI’s Restatement project, rather than the other way around. See Kelley, supra note 144, at
743–44 (“Where, then, did Judge Hand get his formula? We know from his biographers that Learned Hand
was an intellectually ambitious and progressive judge, alive to the latest currents of thought in the legal
community. This found expression in many ways, including Judge Hand’s early membership in the American
Law Institute (ALI) and his vigorous support for its project of restating the common law. This suggests that a
likely source for Hand’s description of the negligence standard would be the Restatement of the Division of
the Law Relating to Negligence, approved by the ALI at its annual meeting in 1934. Sure enough, when we
turn to that Restatement we find negligence explained as conduct posing an unreasonable foreseeable risk of
harm to another. The Restatement defined an unreasonable risk as ‘one of such magnitude as to outweigh what
the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.’ The Restatement went
on to list factors to be considered in determining the utility of the actor’s conduct, as well as factors considered
in determining the magnitude of the risk.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 291
(1939))); see also Randy Lee, A Look at God, Feminism, and Tort Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 387 (1992)
(“The Restatement approach differs from the Hand test only in that it measures the burden and loss, factors in
terms of social burden and loss rather than in terms of the burden and loss to the parties.”).
159 Frank J. Vandall, Judge Posner’s Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 EMORY L.J. 383, 383
(1986).
160 Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern
Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 591 (2002). But see POSNER, supra note 44, at 169–70
(characterizing Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works as a case illustrating Baron Alderson’s economic
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a tortfeasor’s actions were wrongful or not.161 Instead, a court need only
determine which party is the “cheapest cost avoider”162 (i.e., “the actor who
could most easily discover and inexpensively remediate the hazard”),163 and
then place the cost of accident prevention on this person to encourage them to
take only those precautions that are economically feasible.164 The extent to
which judges actually operate this way, as a descriptive matter, is beyond the
scope of this Article,165 but the fact that the coercive interest in general, and
deterrence in particular, plays at least some role in the way judges think about
remedies seems to be well established.
Finally, the coercive interest also plays a prominent role in the area of
coercive civil contempt. This remedy, which allows a judge to “punish a prior
offense as well as coerce an offender’s future obedience,”166 is an extremely
powerful tool, allowing the judge to coerce a contemnor to perform or refrain
from performing some specified act by imposing a daily fine on the contemnor
or, in extreme cases, to confine him or her until he or she complies with the
judge’s order.167 Once the contemnor, who “carr[ies] the keys of [his] prison in
[his] own pocket[],”168 performs or refrains from performing the specified act,
the contempt is “purged,” and the coercive fine (or imprisonment), having

understanding of the law of negligence, and remarking that although the injury was “of unprecedented
severity,” the court did not find negligence because “[t]he damage was not so great as to make the expected
cost of the accident greater than the cost of prevention” because “the probability [of the loss] had been low”).
161 Kelley & Wendt, supra note 160, at 591–92 (citing Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective
Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2402–13 (1990)).
162 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1119 (1972).
163 M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the Lenses of
Corrective Justice and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017, 1047 (1998).
164 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 155, at 818 (noting that “[t]he Hand Norm tells us that it is negligent to
omit a precaution if the reduction in expected accident costs would have been greater than the costs of the
precaution,” or, stated algebraically, “it is negligent to omit a precaution if PL > B”); Kelley & Wendt, supra
note 160, at 591 (“[A]dvocates of the Carroll Towing Co. test have suggested that the ordinary reasonable
person standard asks a cost-benefit question: whether the burden of taking precautions against a foreseeable
risk is less than the foreseeable probability times the foreseeable gravity of threatened harm to others if the
precautions are not taken.” (footnote omitted)).
165 Anecdotally, many examples can be provided in which judges both embrace and reject the coercive
interest as an organizing remedial principle. Compare Van Wagner Adver. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d
756, 760–61 (N.Y. 1986) (encouraging efficient breach by refusing to award specific performance in a contract
governing the lease of a billboard), with Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1948)
(refusing to allow an efficient breach where one party “has deliberately broken his agreement”).
166 Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994).
167 Comment, The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 120, 120 (1965).
168 In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
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achieved its objective, comes to an end.169 It is this power that distinguishes
law “from mere social obligation,”170 and “[w]ithout the availability of civil
contempt, the law as between private parties loses its coercive quality, and for
all practical purposes becomes mere voluntarism rather than law.”171
It is one thing to acknowledge that the coercive interest plays an important
role in structuring our thinking about the way judges do (and ought to) award
numerous remedies, but could this remedial interest serve to effectively
organize all of our thinking about remedies, as some law and economics
scholars might suggest? Here, the answer must be no. First, such a position
would seem to undermine the restorative interest (quadrant I), in that it would
deny a victim of wrongdoing a right to just compensation if such compensation
were deemed unnecessary to deter a wrongdoer—or other members of society
(including the victim)—from committing a similar wrongful act in the
future.172 And second, the wholesale adoption of the coercive interest could
also undermine the retributive interest (quadrant II), in that it could
occasionally require a judge to punish an innocent party in a particularly
newsworthy, high-profile case for the purpose of deterring others, all of which
could help achieve a greater social good.173 For, as others have argued
169

Id.
Gwynn v. Gwynn, 530 P.2d 1311, 1316 (Alaska 1975) (Connor, J., dissenting).
171 Id. Justice Connor went on to note that “[t]he ability of one party to invoke the remedy of civil
contempt is vital to the functioning of the legal order, as well as the effectuation of the particular rights which
that party seeks to enforce.” Id.
172 In fact, it is an overreliance on quadrant III that has caused some law and economics scholars to submit
proposals that either ignore, or are anathema to, the restorative interest (quadrant I). See, e.g., David Rosenberg
& Steven Shavell, Essay, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation Costs, 91 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2005) (proposing
to halve litigation costs while preserving effective deterrence by choosing only one half of all cases brought
before a court to be litigated, while doubling the damages award for the victorious plaintiffs in those cases).
173 PINCOFFS, supra note 17, at 33 (noting that although the utilitarian “will punish when, and only
when . . . there is likely to be less mischief than if he did not punish, or punished in some other way,” it will
sometimes be the case that “the best way to minimize mischief would be to punish an innocent man”); see also
id. at 34 (“Would not a consistent utilitarian judge sometimes be constrained by the principle of the
minimization of mischief to make use of misplaced punishment for the reduction of crime? How, as a
utilitarian, could he fail to punish [an innocent] man . . . if an example were needed?”). Pincoffs further
explained that “[n]ot only . . . will the utilitarian judge occasionally punish the innocent, but also he will from
time to time reward the guilty.” Id. at 37. This position, however, is untenable.
170

To punish an innocent or reward a guilty man seems the very paradigm of injustice; and, to the
extent that we value justice, we seem unable to accept the utilitarian position insofar as it bears
on punishment.
Even if it can be shown that the utilitarian judge would very seldom punish an innocent or
reward a guilty man, he would not—we are sure—refrain on principle from such acts, for he has
only one principle: the maximization of public happiness. Guided by this one principle he cannot
but regard the prisoner before the bar as a possible lever for the public weal. But to make use of
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previously, “it is the threat of punishment and not punishment itself which
deters,” and so long as “men believe that punishment has occurred even if in
fact it has not,”174 actual punishment of the wrongdoer would be unnecessary
as the coercive interest will have accomplished its goals.
Therefore, although the coercive interest plays an important role in the law
of remedies175 and has been used by courts from time to time to justify extracompensatory remedies,176 its wholesale adoption seems impractical, in that it
would not only require judges to punish wrongdoers more severely than
warranted (based on the harm they have caused) for the sake of deterrence, but
would allow society to sacrifice innocent parties on the altar of social justice
for the sake of the greater good—a proposition that not only offends our
notions of justice and fair play, but, to my knowledge, has not been accepted
by any court.
D. The Protective Interest
Before turning to the protective interest itself, it will be useful to pause and
summarize what we have covered thus far. We have seen that the restorative,
retributive, and coercive interests can each be used to justify an assortment of
remedies awarded by courts, and that each of these interests contains important
clues about the way individual remedies are conceptualized and administered.
We have also seen, however, that none of the theories we have discussed is
capable, by itself, of uniting the kaleidoscope of remedies frequently
prisoners in this opportunistic way is to ignore the demands of justice. This is the center of
gravity of the argument [against utilitarianism].
Id. (emphasis omitted).
It is important to note, of course, that just as the utilitarian criticisms of retributivism did not render
utilitarianism true, so too is it that these retributivist criticisms of utilitarianism do not render retributivism
true. See id. at 48.
174 Mabbott, supra note 39, at 152.
175 See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439–40 (2001) (“[C]itizens
and legislators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order to
deter what they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct;
efficiency is just one consideration among many.” (alteration in original) (quoting Marc Galanter & David
Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1450 (1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
176 See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (awarding
$5,000 in compensatory damages and $186,000 in punitive damages to guests bitten by bedbugs on the ground
that “[t]he defendant’s behavior was outrageous but the compensable harm done was slight”); Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382 (Ct. App. 1981) (justifying punitive damages on the ground that “the
manufacturer may find it more profitable to treat compensatory damages as a part of the cost of doing business
rather than to remedy the defect”).
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administered by judges under a single conceptual umbrella. If, as I have
suggested, each remedy tends to advance the goals of one or more distinct
remedial interests, each with its own temporal and personal perspective, does
this mean that the legal realists have won after all, in that a judge is free to
choose the remedial interest by which he or she will decide a case based on
what he or she had for breakfast?
Before answering this question, it is important to note that, up until now,
we have mostly considered the three previous remedial interests in isolation, as
though each remedy could be siloed and understood through a single privileged
perspective. What we have seen, however, is that while each interest yields
important clues about the remedial puzzle as a whole, each interest is, in the
end, simply one piece of the larger remedial puzzle. Each piece, to be sure,
reveals a great deal about the nature of a given remedy that ostensibly lies
within its four corners, but necessarily leaves out important information
contained in the surrounding pieces. Even more importantly, each piece, taken
in isolation, tells us very little about the way the remedial puzzle should itself
be put together.
This final section to Part II, therefore, takes a slightly different approach. In
addition to examining the protective interest—the fourth and final piece of the
remedial puzzle—it spends some time exploring the conceptual space shared
between and among each of the remedial interests previously discussed. In so
doing, it is my hope that the law of remedies will be advanced in two important
ways. First, such an approach will allow us to better understand perhaps the
most important remedial interest (the protective interest) that, up until now, has
been paid scant attention to by scholars and judges alike. Indeed, the
identification of this interest alone could go a long way toward providing
scholars and judges with a theoretically sound and juridically compelling
justification upon which to base future remedial awards. Second, and perhaps
even more importantly, by laying bare the relationship between and among all
four remedial interests, it will be seen that all four remedial interests are
invoked, to a greater or lesser extent, in the awarding of most remedies. Judges
and policy makers who understand this relationship will not only better
understand the effects of awarding a given remedy, but will also be able to
fashion more complete and efficient remedies than would otherwise be
possible, while better justifying those remedies that may appear, at first glance,
to be either too harsh or too lenient.
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With this background in mind, we are ready to turn our attention to the
protective interest itself. Like the coercive interest, the protective interest is
forward-looking, but unlike the coercive interest, the protective interest
analyzes the wrong at issue from the potential victim’s (rather than
wrongdoer’s) perspective. Perhaps the most commonly recognized protective
remedy is the preventive injunction,177 which, like restorative remedies,
focuses on the victim’s rights, but, unlike restorative remedies, aims to
maintain the potential victim in his or her rightful position, rather than
allowing the wrongdoer to harm the victim and then restoring the victim to his
or her rightful position.178
In this regard, the protective interest operates much like Calabresi and
Melamed’s property rule, which requires “that someone who wishes to remove
the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction
in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller,” whereas a
remedy protected by, say, the restorative interest would operate according to
their liability rule, which would only allow a wrongdoer to “destroy the initial
entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it.”179
Although there is some truth to this statement, it seems strange to discuss how
entitlements are protected, in a remedial context, before even defining what an
entitlement is, in a rights-based context.180
In Anglo-American law, at least, the decision between protecting a party
with a property rule or a liability rule is governed by the long-standing
“irreparable injury” rule.181 According to this rule, which has policed the
divide between courts of law and courts of equity for half a millennium, courts
only invoke the protective interest and grant an equitable injunction
(preventing the victim from being harmed) in those instances where money
damages would be inadequate to put the injured party back in the position he
or she occupied prior to the injury.182 In theory, this rule allows wrongdoers to
177 Declaratory judgments are another important preventive remedy, in which courts help parties avoid
future harm by declaring in advance how the law would apply to a potential future dispute. For an excellent
article discussing the pros and cons of using declaratory judgments to prevent such disputes ex ante, rather
than adjudicate them ex post, see Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (2010).
178 See infra text accompanying notes 181–87.
179 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 162, at 1092.
180 An attempt to more precisely define the concept of entitlement, and explore the relationship between
rights and remedies, will be taken up in a future article.
181 See generally LAYCOCK, supra note 37.
182 See, e.g., Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 356 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The
very thing which makes an injury ‘irreparable’ is the fact that no remedy exists to repair it.”), rev’d on other
grounds, 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
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infringe on a victim’s rights in the present so long as they are willing and able
to pay money damages in the future.183 In practice, however, few courts allow
a wrongdoing party to behave in such a manner—in spite of this well-settled
rule,184 which seems to be honored more in the breach than in the observance.
This insight can help shed light on each of the remedial interests previously
discussed.
Consider, for example, the case of Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co.,185 in
which a landowner sought an injunction to prevent a company from cutting the
timber on his land. Because the plaintiff’s timber had a readily ascertainable
market value, and because the defendant was willing to pay this value after
chopping down the wood, the irreparable injury rule (in addition to wellestablished precedent) required that the court allow the defendant to chop
down the plaintiff’s timber, leaving the plaintiff to recover only the restorative
(and substitutionary) remedy of money damages.186 The court, albeit
uncomfortably, even admitted as much.187 Yet, the judges understandably felt
uneasy about the case and were uncomfortable applying the rule.188 Something
seemed strange—even perverse—with allowing one party to run roughshod
over a victim’s rights simply because that party could pay for the harm it
caused.189 Something seemed wrong, in short, with protecting a plaintiff’s right
with a liability rule rather than a property rule even though doing so would
183 See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at vii (“[C]ourts will not prevent harm if money damages could
adequately compensate for the harm. [The rule] says that I am free to destroy your property as long as I can
pay for it.”); see also HOLMES, supra note 31, at 236 (“It is true that in some instances equity does what is
called compelling specific performance. But . . . . [t]his remedy is an exceptional one. The only universal
consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised
event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfillment has
gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.”); Holmes, supra note 28, at 462 (“The duty to
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and
nothing else.”); supra Part II.A.
184 See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at 23 (“Courts do not deny specific relief merely because they
judge the legal remedy adequate. The irreparable injury rule almost never bars specific relief, because
substitutionary remedies are almost never adequate. At the stage of permanent relief, any litigant with a
plausible need for specific relief can satisfy the irreparable injury rule.”).
185 73 S.E. 82, 83 (W. Va. 1911).
186 See id. at 84 (“Our rule permits a mere trespasser to utterly destroy the forest of his neighbor, provided
he is solvent and able to respond in damages to the extent of the value thereof.”).
187 See id. at 83 (“This appeal from an order dissolving an injunction awarded to prevent the cutting of
timber on a tract of land . . . would necessarily and inevitably fail under a rule or principle often declared by
this court, if we should adhere to it. Unless the trespass itself constitutes irreparable injury, none is
shown . . . .”).
188 See id. (“However, [the irreparable injury] rule seems not to have commanded uniform approval by the
public, nor by the members of the legal profession . . . .”).
189 See id. at 84.

JIMENEZ GALLEYSPROOFS1

1354

6/26/2013 11:38 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1309

have not only satisfied the irreparable injury rule, but also would have
comported with the restorative interest emphasized in Part II.A.
Having decided to reject the irreparable injury rule (and the restorative
remedy of money damages), upon what principle could a court base its
decision? The retributive interest, discussed in Part II.B, seems inappropriate
here because it would require that a wrongdoing party be retributively
“punished” for the harm it caused, but here, one would have great difficulty
characterizing any action taken by this court—before any harm has occurred—
as “punishment.”190 If, on the one hand, the court allowed the defendant to cut
down the plaintiff’s trees on the condition that the defendant compensated the
plaintiff, the court would have, in effect, granted the defendant the private right
of eminent domain, by which the defendant could seize the trees on the
plaintiff’s property so long as it paid the plaintiff his full market value. Only
the most perversely creative use of language could characterize the granting of
such a power as “punishment.” If, on the other hand, the court issued an
injunction and prevented the defendant from taking what did not belong to it in
the first place, it is once again all but impossible to see how even the most
skilled lexicographer could twist the definition of retributive punishment to
encompass such a remedy. Thus, like the restorative interest, the retributive
interest, quite simply, is not equipped to deal well with cases in which the
harm has not yet occurred and is therefore deficient when it comes to
approaching remedies prospectively.
Might the coercive interest provide a better solution? At first glance, the
coercive interest, with its emphasis on approaching remedies from an ex ante
perspective, seems well suited to the task. A court would simply need to
determine whether allowing the defendant to chop down the plaintiff’s trees
would result, on the one hand, in socially productive activity,191 in which case
the court should allow this activity (by protecting the plaintiff’s right to his
trees with a mere liability rule and allowing the defendant to engage in such
activity in exchange for compensation to the plaintiff), or, on the other hand, in
socially unproductive activity, in which case the court should disallow this
activity (by protecting the plaintiff’s right to his timber with a property rule
and thereby preventing the defendant from engaging in such activity without
the plaintiff’s permission).192
190

See supra text accompanying note 46.
As would be the case, for example, where the defendant is able to put the trees to a higher valued use
than the plaintiff could, perhaps in the form of construction-grade lumber.
192 See supra text accompanying note 133.
191
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Upon closer examination, however, there are several problems with the
coercive interest being applied in such a case. First, as an epistemological
matter, it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether the defendant or
the court is in a better position than the plaintiff in determining how to put the
plaintiff’s resources to their most socially productive use.193 There is, in other
words, a significant risk of undercompensation in allowing anyone other than
the plaintiff to determine how much or how little the plaintiff values a specific
good or service. Second, there is something normatively troubling with the
argument that it is ever justifiable to allow one party to take something
belonging to another on account of it being efficient to do so.194 There are,
after all, other principles besides efficiency with which society is justifiably
concerned. And finally, as a descriptive matter, courts simply do not typically
justify ex ante remedies (e.g., injunctive relief) on efficiency grounds, although
it would be easy for them to do so. Courts do, however, frequently touch upon
(and are guided by) the protective interest in more cases than might at first
meet the eye, as we shall soon see.
To illustrate this point, let us return once more to Pardee to see how the
judges actually decided the case. I noted previously that the judges in Pardee
felt uncomfortable allowing the defendant to cut the plaintiff’s trees, although
governing law (i.e., the irreparable injury rule) seemed to not only allow—but
require—this outcome.195 How, then, did the judges go about protecting the
plaintiff’s property with more than a liability rule? The answer, it turns out, is
by invoking language suggestive of the protective interest itself!
Taking a decidedly ex ante, victim-centered approach to the problem, the
court paid scant attention to the remedy required to make the plaintiff whole
(restorative interest), the proportional punishment to be inflicted on the
defendant to pay for its culpable wrong (retributive interest), or the coercion
necessary to encourage or deter this defendant (or others) from engaging in
socially productive or unproductive activities (coercive interest). Instead, the
court spoke in terms of exercising its “preventive powers” to “protect and
vindicate the right of an owner of property” by way of a property rule, which
would not only ensure that the owner’s property would be “immune[] from
193

See, e.g., Marco J. Jimenez, The Value of a Promise: A Utilitarian Approach to Contract Law
Remedies, 56 UCLA L. REV. 59, 108 (2008).
194 See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 963–69
(1982) (likening efficient breach of contract to efficient theft of property, and rejecting both on moral
grounds).
195 See Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co., 73 S.E. 82, 84 (W. Va. 1911).
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injury,” but would also protect a “fundamental principle[]
of . . . jurisprudence” not sufficiently appreciated by the irreparable injury
rule.196
And although protective remedies have been treated as exceptional in our
common law system, this manner of thinking is far from unusual: whenever the
restorative, retributive, or coercive interest seem incapable of effectively
dealing with the remedial problem at hand, courts often invoke the logic—if
not the words—underlying the protective interest to justify their remedial
choices.197 This often happens whenever the threatened harm can be prevented,
regardless of the irreparable injury rule,198 and is frequent whenever the
defendant’s wrongdoing appears to be intentional. And this is true in numerous
areas of the law ranging from remedies for breach of contract199 to unjust
enrichment200 to encroachment.201 So why does the ostensibly exceptional
protective interest seem to have such wide-ranging scope? In short, as this
Article argues in the next section, it is because each of the other three remedial
interests we have discussed tend to move toward bringing about the ends of the
protective interest. Indeed, although courts generally tend to think about
remedies in terms of restoration, retribution, or coercion, the remedies they
award, in some measure or other, help bring about the aims of protection. This
emphasis on protecting rights, though rarely expressed, was perhaps best
summed up by the court in Pradelt v. Lewis,202 which noted that “the duty of
196

Id. at 83–85.
See, e.g., Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 122–23 (9th Cir. 1968)
(repeatedly emphasizing the need to “protect” trademark owner from “deliberate” infringement); Campbell
Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1948) (acknowledging the irreparable injury rule but
simultaneously finding that there is “no reason why a court should be reluctant to grant specific relief when it
can be given without supervision of the court or other time-consuming processes against one who has
deliberately broken his agreement”); U.C.C. § 2-609 official cmt. 1 (2011) (“[T]he essential purpose of a
contract between commercial men is actual performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a
promise plus the right to win a lawsuit . . . .”).
198 See supra note 183.
199 See supra notes 85, 95, 98–99, 197 (discussing increased remedies for deliberate breaches of
contracts).
200 See supra text accompanying notes 99–128 (discussing increased remedies for deliberate unjust
enrichment cases).
201 See, e.g., Ariola v. Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ill. 1959) (stating that injunctions are only typically
issued in accidental encroachment cases after weighing such factors as the “expense and difficulty of removing
an encroachment in relation to the damage resulting therefrom, or the benefit that would accrue from its
removal”). However, “where the encroachment was intentional, in that [the] defendant proceeded despite
notice or warning, or where he failed to take proper precautions . . . the courts . . . have refused to balance the
equities, and have issued the mandatory injunction without regard to the relative convenience or hardship
involved.” Id. (citations omitted).
202 130 N.E. 785 (Ill. 1921).
197
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the courts is to protect rights, and innocent complainants cannot be required to
suffer the loss of their rights because of expense to the wrongdoer.”203 This
thinking lay beneath the surface of much of our remedies jurisprudence,
although it is not always so explicitly expressed.
E. Summary
Thus far, I have shown that the law has come a long way since the days of
Charles Alan Wright, whose judges had “no place where [they could] find the
whole [law of remedies] put in perspective,” but were left to comb through
treatises governing “Damages, Equity, Specific Performance, Injunction,
Quasi-Contracts, Rescission, Declaratory Judgments, Restitution, and perhaps
others”204 whenever they had to decide a remedial problem. While things are
certainly better today, the law of remedies still lacks an overarching
organizational structure, although, as I have argued, much structure is provided
by way of the four remedial interests outlined above. By thinking about
remedies in terms of these interests, each of which emphasizes a unique
temporal and personal perspective, judges can better structure remedies by
thinking about them in terms of the remedial goals they wish to achieve.
I have also shown, however, that no single remedial interest can (or should)
be used, as a general matter, to decide all remedies cases. Instead, recourse to
all four remedial interests (and especially the protective interest) is needed to
make sense of the numerous (and varied) remedial problems arising in our
courts’ dockets on a daily basis.
III. REMEDIAL CONSILIENCE: UNIFYING THE FOUR REMEDIAL INTERESTS
Up to this point, I have presented each remedial interest as offering a
unique vantage point through which one may view the law of remedies in
general and the numerous remedies awarded by judges on a daily basis. But, as
suggested in Part I of this Article, these interests do not stand alone, but are
related to one another in a predictable fashion, which may help judges think
more clearly about the remedial goals underlying all remedies. Therefore, this
Part briefly examines the relationship between and among the four remedial
interests and shows how the choice (consciously or otherwise) to view
remedies through a specific remedial lens not only fails to take into account
203 Id. at 787 (quoting Gulick v. Hamilton, 122 N.E. 537, 540 (Ill. 1919)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
204 Wright, supra note 1, at 376.
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important remedial consequences that are too often ignored, but (even more
importantly) also fails to take into account the purpose toward which all
remedies are—and ought to be—naturally directed: the protection and
preservation of the victim’s rights.
A. The Four Remedial Interests in an Ideal World
Let us begin by imagining a fictitious society, Law Land, composed of four
individuals: Wrongdoer, Victim, Judge, and Observer. Suppose that Judge
(who we might think of along the lines of Orwell’s “Big Brother”) follows
Wrongdoer and Victim’s every move, and has perfect knowledge of the
goings-on in her society. Observer, meanwhile, mostly minds his own
business, but is curious about how Wrongdoer, Victim, and Judge interact.
Suppose that one day, Victim, upon information and belief, comes to learn
that Wrongdoer intends to steal his shovel. Assume further that later that day,
Wrongdoer in fact steals, and accidentally breaks, Victim’s shovel, which is
valued at $20. Victim, upon learning that his shovel is missing, immediately
sues Wrongdoer.205 The matter comes before Judge, who, drawing upon her
perfect knowledge of the goings-on in her society, correctly determines that
Victim’s shovel has gone missing due to Wrongdoer’s deliberate actions and
not, for example, from Victim’s own carelessness in misplacing the shovel.
Judge, therefore, decides to issue an award in Victim’s favor and returns to her
chambers to set about writing her opinion. Upon what grounds shall she justify
her remedy?
One answer, of course, and that most frequently used by judges today, is
that she is likely to take an ex post, victim-oriented view and justify the
remedy by way of the restorative interest.206 Putting pen to paper, she begins to
write:
“The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party,
as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it not
207
been for the wrong of the other party.” Here, had it not been for
Wrongdoer’s actions, Victim would have had a shovel, valued at $20,
so this court therefore finds that Wrongdoer shall pay Victim $20.

205
206
207

Like ours, theirs is a litigious society.
See, e.g., United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958).
Id.
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Judge looks upon her work with some satisfaction, and, giving the matter
more thought, it occurs to her that the $20 will not come from a money tree,
but must be paid by Wrongdoer. Thus, Judge realizes that what will feel like
restoration to Victim will feel like retribution to Wrongdoer.208 Following our
definition of retributive punishment above,209 Wrongdoer will feel both that (a)
he is being punished for breaching a legally recognized duty, and (b) that the
quantum of punishment has been exacted in proportion to the grievousness of
Wrongdoer’s wrong. Therefore, Judge realizes that her opinion can also be
justified on retributive grounds. To explain this, Judge takes out a fresh sheet
of paper and begins to write:
The fundamental principle of retribution is to punish the wrongdoing
party, as nearly as possible, in proportion to the grievousness of his
210
harm. Wishing neither to punish Wrongdoer too little or too much
for his actions, the court determines that an appropriate punishment
shall be $20, which will take from Wrongdoer the dollar equivalent
of what Wrongdoer himself has taken from Victim.

Judge is pleased by the equivalence between the two monetary awards,
although the justifications used are quite different. On the one hand, it strikes
Judge as uncanny that an award punishing Wrongdoer should be the same as
an award compensating Victim because she can recall many cases in which
other judges struggled to draw a firm line between compensation and
punishment.211 On the other hand, she is satisfied that she can kill two remedial
birds with one legal stone, so to speak, and compensate Victim while
punishing Wrongdoer without having to choose between the principles of
restoration and retribution.
Just as she is about to publish her decision, it occurs to Judge that perhaps
she is taking too narrow a view of the problem. Judge recalls that Observer,
always curious about the goings-on in Law Land, will soon read her decision,
which will itself create a precedent by which Observer will feel justified to act.

208 In a somewhat different form, this point has been recognized by our nation’s highest court. See, e.g.,
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003) (“Compensatory damages . . . already
contain [a] punitive element.”).
209 See supra Part II.B.
210 See supra note 47.
211 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) (“[T]he consensus today is that
punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution . . . .”); see also 1B COMM. ON PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS’N OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF N.Y., NEW YORK PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 2:278 (3d ed. 2013) (“The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate
the plaintiff but to punish the defendant . . . .”).
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“Perhaps,” she thinks to herself, “rather than compensating Victim or
punishing Wrongdoer, what I should be doing is ensuring that Wrongdoer and
others who learn of Wrongdoer’s punishment, such as Observer, no longer
engage in such activities again. What remedy,” she wonders, “would best
accomplish this goal?”
Recalling her training in law and economics, Judge remembers that the best
remedy would not only leave the victim indifferent between not being injured,
on the one hand, and being injured plus being compensated, on the other,212
but, where the goal is deterrence, as it is here, it would ensure that Wrongdoer
(and others, like Observer, who learn of Wrongdoer’s punishment) will have
no incentive to engage in such socially unproductive activities in the future.213
Because Judge has at her disposal the means to detect every wrong in her
society,214 she quickly realizes that an award of $20 will make Victim
indifferent between no injury, on the one hand, and injury plus $20, on the
other, and will likewise ensure that Wrongdoer no longer has any incentive to
steal Victim’s shovel.215 In Law Land, therefore, $20 again seems to be the
perfect remedy.
At this point, Judge realizes that it must be more than mere coincidence that
the restorative, retributive, and coercive interest all point to the same $20
remedy. Further, Judge realizes that, in the case before her, her decision to
invoke any one of these remedial interests would have worked just as well to
protect any of the other remedial interests just discussed, and would even have
helped protect Victim from future harmful acts (the protective interest) by
removing Wrongdoer’s (and Observer’s) incentive to steal Victim’s property in
the future.
Judge begins to consider, however, exactly how Victim would be protected.
If she writes an opinion announcing that $20 shall be the fine for any future
theft of Victim’s shovel, Wrongdoer (and Observer) would have no incentive
to steal the item, assuming they could go elsewhere and purchase the shovel
212 See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 491 (“Perfect compensation is a sum of money that
leaves the victim indifferent between the injury with compensation or no injury.”).
213 More formally, “[s]ocially optimal deterrence occurs at the point where the marginal social cost of
reducing crime further equals the marginal social benefit.” Id. at 512.
214 We will also assume, for the time being, that it is costless for the judge to do so, an assumption that
will be revised momentarily.
215 This is because the wrongdoer will immediately be detected, and will be required to either give the
shovel back to the victim, where the shovel is available, or pay its dollar equivalent to the victim ($20), before
the wrongdoer is able to put the shovel to productive use. The wrongdoer’s actions, in other words, would be
entirely pointless.
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for $20, its fair market value. Why? Because the Judge would detect the
transgression and then force Wrongdoer (or Observer, should he, too, become
a wrongdoer) to pay $20 to Victim. Wrongdoer, in other words, would be
indifferent between stealing Victim’s shovel and paying $20 in damages, and
purchasing a shovel from the store for $20.
Pondering this, Judge is overcome by a terrible insight: she realizes that,
although her decision would make Wrongdoer indifferent between stealing
Victim’s shovel (and paying $20 in damages) and purchasing a shovel from the
store for $20, Wrongdoer would only be indifferent between these two acts!
This means that Wrongdoer is likely to do whatever is most convenient in the
situation he finds himself in at any given time. When Wrongdoer is close to the
store when overcome by a desperate urge to own a shovel, which will happen,
say, 50% of the time, Wrongdoer will purchase the shovel. But when
Wrongdoer is close to Victim when overcome by the same desperate urge to
own a shovel, which will happen the other 50% of the time, Wrongdoer will
steal the shovel and pay damages to Victim. To protect Victim’s rightful
position, therefore, Judge will have to do something more than just deter
Wrongdoer, which can only be accomplished by setting the price of the remedy
above the level at which Wrongdoer is indifferent.
Thinking back on this exercise, Judge realizes that these remedial interests
do not operate in isolation, but that the pursuit of one juridical interest leads
logically to the advancement of other remedial goals. In short, she notices that
choosing one remedial interest (e.g., restoration) does not exclude—but
necessarily entails—the pursuit of other remedial interests (e.g., protection).
Further, Judge recognizes an important pattern to this relationship: whereas
restoration requires that Wrongdoer pay a sum of money to Victim, enforcing
the award requires retributively punishing Wrongdoer. In addition, Judge
recognizes that enforcing the retributive interest by punishing Wrongdoer will
also operate to deter not only Wrongdoer, but others, such as Observer, who
learn about Wrongdoer’s punishment, thus invoking the coercive interest. And
finally, Judge realizes that coercing others will have the effect of preventing, to
some extent, harm to Victim, such that employing the coercive interest will
have the effect of also invoking the protective interest. She notices, in effect,
that there is a clear line running from the restorative interest to the retributive
interest to the coercive interest to the protective interest, per Figure 3 below.
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FIGURE 3: THE REMEDIAL PATHWAY
Temporal Element
Ex Ante
Ex Post
Victim

Protection (IV)

Restoration (I)

Wrongdoer

Coercion (III)

Retribution (II)

Personal
Element

In contemplating this diagram, Judge wonders why, if these relationships
among the remedial interests hold in the real world, so many other judges, in
the course of deciding a case, go out of their way to declare that they have
chosen a particular remedy for its ability to accomplish one part of a remedial
goal (e.g., awarding money damages to compensate the victim) at the expense
of—and while going out of their way to disclaim that they are furthering—
another part of a different remedial goal (e.g., punishing the wrongdoer)?216
Judge also worries about the inadequate protection that is indirectly given
to the protective interest when other remedial goals take center stage.
Pondering these questions, Judge attempts to recall some of the less perfect
societies she has studied—societies in which the bad guy is not always caught,
or caught but not prosecuted, or prosecuted but not found liable, or found liable
but unable (or unwilling) to pay, or where the thing that gets stolen or
destroyed (e.g., Victim’s shovel) cannot always be valued (as with an
heirloom) or replaced (as with the loss of human life). In such messy worlds,
what is the relationship between and among the remedial interests previously
discussed?
B. The Four Remedial Interests in an Imperfect World
To examine this relationship, Judge conjures up the following test case.
Suppose a large auto manufacturer wants to offer an affordable subcompact car
and is presented with two choices. First, the company can place the fuel tank
above the car’s rear axle, which will increase the car’s safety by providing
216

See supra Part II.
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additional crunch space in the event of a rear-end collision, but will reduce the
available trunk space which will, in turn, decrease overall sales. Second, the
company can place the fuel tank behind the rear axle of the car, which will
reduce the car’s crunch space (and, therefore, its overall safety) by causing the
gas tank to explode in the event of a rear-end collision. It is estimated that
about 180 drivers will suffer agonizing burn deaths, and about another 180 will
suffer agonizing burn injuries, but due to the increase in overall trunk space,
many consumers (not knowing about this defect) will buy such a car, which
will increase the company’s overall sales.
Suppose further that the company, about to select the second option, learns
that all of these deaths and injuries can be prevented by reinforcing the
automobiles at a cost of a few extra dollars per automobile. Employing
Learned Hand’s basic formula, B < PL, the company calculates that each death
will cost the company $200,000, and each burn injury will cost the company
$67,000. Because 180 individuals are expected to suffer each type of injury,
the company multiplies 180 by $267,000, and calculates that the total cost to
the company from the deaths and injuries that will be caused if the repairs are
not undertaken will be roughly $50 million. Having calculated PL, the
company still needs a figure for B. The repairs, it is learned, will cost the
company around $137 million. Plugging this amount into B, the company
realizes that it will not be found negligent if it undertakes the repairs; however,
it nevertheless realizes that, from an economic point of view, it should not
undertake the repairs, because it could earn an additional $87 million by
manufacturing the defective cars (which will sell for an additional $137
million) while paying out damages of $50 million. Not surprisingly, the
company elects not to have the repairs made.217
In such a situation, what now would be the relationship between and among
the remedial interests? Beginning first with the restorative interest, Judge

217 This “hypothetical” case is based loosely on the facts of Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. See 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 384 (Ct. App. 1981) (“There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design
defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit
analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits.”); see also Barbara Ann White, RiskUtility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A Hand That Helps or a Hand That Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. REV.
77, 131 n.279 (1990) (“In making its cost-benefit analysis, Ford used the figures calculated by the National
Highway Traffic and Safety Association to be the value of human life ($200,000) and serious burn injury
($67,000). Using an estimation of 180 burn deaths and 180 serious burn injuries per year, Ford calculated that
the benefits that would be realized by adding safety devices to the Pinto’s fuel tank, in terms of lives saved and
injuries prevented, would equal approximately $50 million dollars, whereas the associated costs would be
$137 million dollars.”).
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imagines a case in which a victim is severely burned in a horrible crash, and
the company is forced to pay $67,000 in compensatory damages. If we assume
that $67,000 is truly compensatory, at least to the extent such compensatory
remedies can be said to actually “restore,” either in-kind or substitutionarily,
the victim to the position they occupied ex ante, what can we say about the
effect of such an award on the other remedial interests?
Even putting aside the fact that the company’s actions may entitle the
victim to a separate award of punitive damages,218 Judge realizes that the
restorative remedy of $67,000 does, to some extent, also punish the wrongdoer
for the harm it has caused because the $67,000 going to the victim is coming
out of the company’s coffers, and, as such, bears a proportional relationship to
the harm it has caused this victim. So far, this is just a mirror image of the
shovel example above, where the $20 paid to Victim (restoration) was the
same $20 paid by Wrongdoer (retribution). Due to the messiness of the real
world, however, and unlike the shovel example above, Judge realizes that other
similarly situated victims may be injured in accidents for which the company is
not sued (perhaps because the victim never learned that the accident was due,
in large part, to a manufacturer’s design defect). Or, perhaps, Judge realizes
that the company may be sued but, due to judicial error, found not liable. Or,
carrying this line of thought further, the company may be sued, and found
liable, but win on appeal. Or, taking the case further still, the victim might sue,
the company might be found liable, the victim might win on appeal, but the
company may become bankrupt before the victim is paid.
Judge realizes, in other words, that although a restorative remedy will, to
some extent, further the ends of the retributive interest, it will only do so
indirectly and may not do so at all if any of the intervening factors discussed
above are present. It is unlikely, in other words, that the retributive interest will
be given full effect without a court specifically taking it into account.
Turning to the retributive interest, Judge notices another interesting
phenomenon. Due to enforcement error, cost of detection, etc., a fully
retributive remedy, which would cause the wrongdoer to fully pay for the harm
it has caused (but no more), will have some deterrent value, to be sure, but will
not achieve the level of optimal deterrence sought by the coercive interest.
218 This, in fact, is what happened in the actual case. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (“There was
ample evidence to support a finding of malice and Ford’s responsibility for malice.”); id. at 391 (“Here, the
judge, exercising his independent judgment on the evidence, determined that a punitive award of 3½ million
dollars was ‘fair and reasonable.’”).
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To see why, let us return to our simple hypothetical in which Wrongdoer
stole Victim’s $20 shovel. In an imperfect world, Wrongdoer’s chance of
getting caught will not be 100%, as we previously assumed, but something
much lower—say 50%. Therefore, Wrongdoer, in deciding whether to steal
Victim’s shovel or purchase his own, will take into account his chance of being
caught, along with the damages he will have to pay if caught. Wrongdoer
reasons that one half of the time he will be caught and be required to either
return the shovel to Victim or pay $20 in damages. But the other half of the
time, Wrongdoer will get away with his theft and will realize a gain of $20. On
average, therefore, each theft will cost Wrongdoer $10 in damages (0.5 × $20
= $10), but because each theft will yield a total of $20, he will, on average,
realize a profit of $10 per theft ($20 − $10 = $10). Because theft is, on average,
profitable to Wrongdoer, pure retributive punishment will not adequately deter
him from engaging in this particular wrongful activity.219 For the same reason,
retributive punishment will not adequately deter the car manufacturer from
putting out a defective product, as only a portion of its defective cars will
malfunction, its fault will only be detected in a portion of those malfunctions, it
will only be sued in a portion of such detected malfunctions, it will only lose a
portion of those cases in which it is sued, etc. To be sure, retributive
punishment does provide some deterrence, but the amount of deterrence it
provides is far from optimal.
Thus, after considering the coercive interest, Judge realizes that the only
way to optimally deter the potential wrongdoer from engaging in such
activities is to put herself in the wrongdoer’s shoes and ensure that the net
benefit to the wrongdoer from engaging in such activities would be zero.
Returning to the theft example, this can be done by multiplying the damages
award by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement. There, because the
thief will only be caught stealing the shovel 50% of the time, we must multiply
the damages award ($20) by the reciprocal of 50% (or 200%), which means
that one can only optimally deter Wrongdoer by requiring the thief to pay $40
each time he is caught. By doing so, we would exceed what is called for under
the principle of retributive punishment, but would realize the goals of the
coercive interest by removing from Wrongdoer any incentive he might have
had to engage in such deleterious behavior. This is so because although each
successful theft will still gain him $20, he must now pay $40 when he is
caught, and, because he is caught 50% of the time, he will recognize, on
219 This example is based loosely on an example provided by Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen in their
excellent book. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 493.
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average, a profit of $0 per theft.220 In addition to accounting for the probability
of the wrongdoer being caught, a successful coercive remedy would also take
into account other factors such as: the probability of the victim bringing a
lawsuit, the probability of the victim winning the lawsuit, the probability of the
victim being successful on appeal, the probability of the wrongdoer being
liquid, etc.221
Finally, turning to the protective interest itself, Judge will recognize that
optimal deterrence will provide some measure of protection to potential
victims, but, as discussed previously,222 will by no means ensure that potential
victims receive the same level of protection they would have if Judge focused
on the protective interest directly. This is so for several reasons. First, as
previously discussed, a perfect coercive remedy would make Wrongdoer
indifferent between two acts, but, all things equal, would not protect Victim
more than 50% of the time.223 And second, one need only recall that the
coercive interest is concerned only with optimally deterring wrongdoers from
engaging in socially unproductive acts, which therefore allows wrongdoers to
engage in those activities in which the wrongdoer can internalize (i.e., pay for)
his external harms. The Learned Hand formula discussed earlier, for example,
embodies this approach.224 But victims, who place a different value on harms
done to them than would a wrongdoer or court, would undoubtedly require a
much higher price to be paid to ensure they were adequately protected. They
would want, in other words, to be protected with a property rule rather than a
liability rule, and judges would have to determine not how to optimally deter
the wrongdoer, but how to optimally protect the victim, which will require
doing something more than merely making the wrongdoer indifferent between
committing and not committing the wrongful act.225 It will require affording
the victim a certain measure of protection consistent with the importance of the

220 He will gain, in other words, $20 when he is not caught, which will happen 50% of the time, and will
lose $40 when he is caught, which will also happen 50% of the time, requiring the thief to return the $20 from
his initially successful theft along with the $20 (or the shovel) from the subsequently unsuccessful theft.
221 An ideal coercive remedy (in terms of achieving perfect or optimal deterrence) will multiply all of
these probabilities with one another, and will then force the thief to pay the reciprocal of these joint
probabilities multiplied by the damages caused.
222 See supra Part III.A.
223 Recall that if Wrongdoer must pay the same amount (e.g., $20) whether he steals the shovel and pays
damages to Victim, or purchases the shovel from a store, we can expect Wrongdoer to engage in whichever act
is most convenient to him at the time. Wrongdoer will therefore engage in each act roughly 50% of the time.
224 See supra note 164.
225 See supra Part III.A.
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right at stake, which will itself require much more careful consideration by
academics, judges, and policy makers than there is scope for in this Article.
C. A Reprise
Returning momentarily to Figure 3, we should not be surprised that
remedies designed to achieve one remedial purpose may have indirect effects
on other important public policy goals. After all, other scholars have attempted
to bring closer together the remedial views of corrective justice and law and
economics for some time.226 What is new, and at least somewhat surprising, is
that there is an orderly and predictable relationship between and among these
remedial relationships, so that the awarding of any particular remedy will fall
within the scope of one of the four remedial interests, and that this interest will,
in turn, move steadily and predictably toward the one remedial interest that has
been underdeveloped and underappreciated in the literature: the protective
interest. This interest, in turn, has the ability to descriptively unite what might
otherwise seem like idiosyncratic remedies accomplishing wildly different
remedial goals and to normatively provide a foundation upon which all
remedies might be based.
That all remedies move toward the protective interest, I believe, is no
accident, though the question really to be answered is this: what, exactly, is it
that the protective interest is protecting? If the answer turns out to be that the
protective interest is protecting some right belonging to the victim, as I believe
it is, then the more interesting question becomes: what is the nature of the
relationship between rights and remedies more generally? Unfortunately, such
inquiries must await exploration in a future article. For the time being,
however, it is enough to recognize the ubiquity (if not primacy) of the
protective interest in all remedial awards, and to ask judges to consider more
carefully the remedial category into which a plaintiff’s desired remedy

226 See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 32, at 17 (“In the classical economic view, the function of
compensatory damages is to force law violators to take account of the harm they inflict. If damage liability is
less than the harm inflicted, potential defendants will violate the law when it is inefficient to do so. If damage
liability exceeds the harm inflicted, potential defendants will obey the law when it is inefficient to do so.
Damages should be set exactly equal to harms inflicted, and then, if the expected profit from a tort or breach of
contract exceeds the expected damages, the actor should go ahead.”); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25,
at 390 (“[The] concept of perfect compensation, based on indifference, is fundamental to an economic account
of incentives. If potential injurers are liable for perfectly compensatory damages, then they will internalize the
external harm caused by accidents. And this creates incentives for the potential injurers to take efficient
precaution.”).
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belongs, and the effect that awarding this remedy will have on other remedial
interests, especially on the protection of victim’s rights.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that all remedies fit into one of four distinct
remedial categories and serve to further one of four distinct remedial interests.
After outlining and discussing each of these interests (the restorative,
retributive, coercive, and protective interests), it has explored the relationship
between and among these interests, and has argued that all remedies, no matter
the remedial category to which they originally belonged, work to further the
goals of an interest previously paid scant attention to by scholars and judges
alike: the protective interest. This Article has also shown that this interest,
though it tends to be the most neglected of the remedial interests, may actually
be the most basic and important. Further, the protective interest may itself
provide important insights regarding the ultimate nature of the relationship
between rights and remedies, to be explored in a follow-up article.

